



Beyond The Figures

...a statistical evaluation of results from the IREV portal for the 2023 Bayelsa, Imo, and Kogi governorship elections.

Ballot Integrity Project

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Kimpact Development Initiative
53 A.N. Amosun Avenue, NAF Valley Estate
Asokoro, FCT, Abuja
Email: info@kimpact.org.ng
Phone: +234 902 0118 336

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This document has been produced by Kimpact Development Initiative (KDI) to provide information on the findings of her Ballot Integrity Project – an effort that analyzes the election results data available on the INEC Result Viewing portal (IReV) and evaluates the overall integrity of the electoral process in the 2023 Bayelsa, Imo and Kogi States off-cycle governorship elections.

Kimpact hereby certifies that all the views expressed in this document accurately reflects the analytical views of the information gathered on IReV, the desk review with election experts and secondary electoral data from desk research, which were verified, reliable and evidence based. Whilst reasonable care has been taken in preparing this document, KIMPACT and FCDO shall take no responsibility for errors, any views expressed, or actions taken due to information provided in this report.

About Kimpact

Kimpact Development Initiative (KDI) is an independent non-governmental organization that advances good governance, democratic rights, public policy, and public engagement. We do this by building informed and active citizens through capacity development, advancing public policies, data-driven advocacy and reforms that give a more supportive environment for citizen-led development.

Our Mission:

To inspire citizen-led democratic and economic development that is anchored on the principles of participation, data-driven advocacy, strong democratic institutions, and public policies.

53 | A.N Amosun Avenue | NAF Valley Estate | Behind Mogadishu Barack | Asokoro | Abuja.

1 | Aresa Close | Behind Union Bank Gbodofon Area | Aregbe | Osogbo, Osun.

+234 813 482 8527 | +234 810 394 7690

info@kimpact.org.ng | www.kimpact.org.ng

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Executive Summary

The Ballot Integrity Project (BIP) led by Kimpact Development Initiative (KDI) in collaboration with electoral experts and comparative democratization researcher (academic), is a statistical evaluation project focused on improving election results management. This report focused on the November 11, 2023, off-cycle governorship elections in Bayelsa, Imo, and Kogi States. Also, it sheds light on critical issues affecting the transparency and integrity of electoral processes in Nigeria.

Key findings from the Bayelsa, Imo, and Kogi off-cycle governorship election ballot integrity report highlighted the adoption of the Continuous Accreditation and Voting System (CAVS) by the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) and its impact on reducing voter disenfranchisement and irregularities. Despite the introduction of CAVS, the report identifies persistent challenges, including discrepancies in accreditation figures and missing ballot incidents, indicating systemic weaknesses in election management.

The report shows how the vulnerabilities in the current system may be allowing human made errors or other irregularities at the polling unit to sometimes scale through the layers of audit at the ward and Local Government Areas (LGA) levels. Some of these errors range from arithmetic errors to discrepancies between accredited voters and total votes cast. Furthermore, Ballot Integrity Project (BIP) check showed that existing initiatives on Election Result Integrity may be predominantly focusing on verifying collated figures at the ward and LGA levels, without scrutinizing election figures originating from the polling units. Consequently, if polling unit results are manipulated or altered, there is a high probability that such initiatives or checks may endorse those results.

Furthermore, the report applies statistical methods, such as Benford's Law and cluster detection analysis, to identify patterns of deviations from expected distributions; exploring how these affect public perception and confidence which in-turn negatively affects democratic health in Nigeria. The analysis underscores the need for enhanced transparency and accountability in the electoral process, emphasizing the importance of stakeholder engagement and rigorous oversight mechanisms.

Recommendations from the report include:

- **Comprehensive Post-Election Audits:** EMBs and other relevant stakeholders should institute a robust and transparent post-election audit process that involves thorough scrutiny of election results, with a focus on identifying and rectifying any inconsistencies, arithmetic errors, or irregularities.
- **Public Release of Backend Data:** EMBs should maintain a commitment to transparency by consistently releasing backend data, including accredited voter figures, on platforms like IReV, allowing independent analysts and civil society organizations to verify and validate the data.
- **Investigate and Address Electoral Anomalies:** EMBs and other relevant stakeholders should establish mechanisms for prompt and impartial investigation of identified irregularities, including over-voting, missing ballots, and discrepancies in accreditation figures. Take appropriate actions based on investigation outcomes.
- **Collaborate and Share Findings:** There is a need to foster collaboration among civil society organizations, election observers, and other stakeholders to share findings, pool resources, and collectively advocate for electoral transparency and integrity.
- **Promote Ethical Conduct:** Political parties are encouraged to prioritize ethical conduct and adherence to electoral laws, emphasizing the significance of a fair and transparent electoral process.
- **Monitor Internal Processes:** INEC and other relevant authorities should implement internal mechanisms to monitor and evaluate the conduct of party agents and officials during elections, with a focus on ensuring compliance with established procedures.

Introduction

Free and fair elections are the cornerstone of every democratic society. A central characteristic of free and fair elections is that citizens' votes counts equally. However, in the end, it is not the people who vote that counts; it's the people who count the votes. This brings the concept of "***Electoral or Ballot Integrity***" to the fore.

Electoral integrity is "any election that is based on the democratic principles of universal suffrage and political equality as reflected in international standards and agreements, and is professional, impartial, and transparent in its preparation and administration throughout the electoral cycle."
(Kofi Annan Foundation, 2012)

Electoral or Ballot Integrity is linked to so many factors – one of which is the voter's confidence. Without integrity, voter confidence can be dwindled. The voters' confidence in the electoral process is very important because it determines the citizens' perception and the level of trust. When an election is perceived as devoid of irregularities, it strengthens people's confidence and support for democratic institutions. Without electoral integrity, public confidence in the election results is weak, and the government lacks the necessary legitimacy. If citizens and or political affiliates do not build trust in the electoral system, then it could jeopardize the peace and harmony that exist within the society to a large extent. It could lead to mass alienation and loss of faith in democracy. Even the perception of fraud can be damaging, making people less inclined to accept election results. This can lead to the breakdown of democracy and the establishment of a dictatorship.


While electoral irregularities can occur at any phase of the electoral process - Irregularities that have permeates the electoral system in developing democracies in time past include but not limited to³ ***Manipulation of Electoral***



Technology, Intimidation, Vote Buying, Information Manipulation and Ballot Stuffing. In Nigeria, the prevalence of election malpractice is a longstanding issue woven into the intricate fabric of the country's political and democratic history. This historical narrative reveals distinct forms of electoral fraud, including⁴:

- **Underage Voting:** Instances of individuals below the legal voting age participating in the electoral process.
- **Ballot Box Snatching:** The forcible seizure of ballot boxes with the intention of stuffing them with thumb-printed votes favoring specific party candidates.
- **Ballot Stuffing:** This involves casting more votes than entitled, either by stuffing multiple ballot papers or voting at multiple booths. Techniques like impersonation and booth capturing compromise the integrity of the electoral process, posing significant challenges to free and fair elections.
- **Intimidation:** Intimidation takes various forms, including violence or the threat of violence directed at voters supporting a particular party. Attacks on polling units in areas favoring a specific party hinder the voting process. It can also involve employing private militant gangs or state security forces to intimidate voters during elections. These tactics create an atmosphere of fear and manipulation, challenging the principles of a democratic electoral process.
- **Voter Suppression:** Deliberate efforts to scare away genuine registered voters from exercising their voting rights, particularly in polling booths located in constituencies favoring the opposition.
- **Media Manipulation:** Tactics involving the premature announcement or publication of incorrect results and wrong candidates as winners before the proper collation by the Electoral Commission. It can also manifest in the form of **Information Manipulation-** The dis-






tribution of false or misleading information aims to sway election outcomes. Smear campaigns against specific candidates or parties further impact voter perceptions, challenging the integrity of the electoral process.

- **Manipulation of Electoral Technology:** Surprisingly, the very technology meant to refine and enhance the electoral process may become a tool for electoral fraud. This can take the form of human interference in the operations of the technology to favor a candidate than the other.
- **Vote Buying:** Commonly known as “*cash for votes*,” this phenomenon commercializes the voting process. Voters are enticed with money or rewards to influence their voting decisions, posing a threat to the integrity of the electoral process.
- **Misleading or Confusing Ballot Papers:** Design features intended to confuse voters and discourage votes for a particular party or candidate are employed. Instances of poor or misleading design subvert democratic principles, contributing to electoral irregularities.
- **Mis-recording of Votes:** Officials record votes differently from voters’ intentions, with vulnerable groups, such as the blind, being particularly susceptible to manipulation and misinformation. This undermines the accuracy and reliability of the electoral process.

Within the electoral landscape of Nigeria, one notable area plagued by a persistent history of irregularities is the election result process and its management. Over time, various actors have sought to manipulate regional or national elections, particularly focusing on the manipulation of results. This takes the form of altering vote counts to change election outcomes, engaging in deliberate, one-sided, and improper counting of votes, switching results before or after collation to favor specific party candidates, and manipulating vote shares to the advantage of favored candidates while diminishing those of opposing candidates or parties. These practices have led many election experts to identify Nigeria’s election result counting and collation as the weakest link in the electoral process, contributing to concerns about the overall integrity of the electoral system.

Like in other countries of the world, election result is only as credible as the electoral process itself. A poorly managed electoral process, and a lack of transparency in result management can severely undermine public confidence in electoral democracy. Addressing these concerns is imperative, and it needs to



start with uncovering the underlying issues and the nature and dynamics of these results management irregularities.

Presenting evidence of irregularities can at least serve to hold actors accountable. The detection of election fraud, however, is challenging, as illegitimate activities that aim to manipulate the vote are difficult to observe directly⁵. Notably, election result irregularities can be done with or without the Electoral Commission - Perpetrators of electoral fraud do so either with the expectation that the fraud will not be discovered by EMBs or connive with willing EMB officials, Security Agencies, or ad-hoc poll workers. Researchers and policymakers often rely on statistical methods to uncover unusual patterns in the official election data that might serve as plausible evidence that election results were tampered with. Political scientists have presented an arsenal of methods to detect election irregularities, **ranging from statistical outliers, irregularities in vote-share distributions, Benfords Law, and machine learning techniques**. Particularly, influential and promising fraud-detection methods include analysis of political party vote share and voter turnout, and analysis of cumulative winning party vote share and voter turnout⁶; and analysis of the unusual distribution of digits in the vote count data⁷.

Given the foregoing, the recent off-cycle governorship elections held on November 11, 2023, in Bayelsa, Kogi, and Imo states encapsulated the spectrum of electoral experiences- some commendable, others concerning, and a few outright alarming.

Some of the good remains:

- Ad-hoc officers arrived earlier in most Polling units (PUs), which translated into elections starting on time in Bayelsa and Kogi – also some parts of Imo state than they did during the general elections earlier in the year.
- There was priority voting for the elderly, pregnant women, nursing mothers, and persons with disabilities.
- The three elections were concluded on the first ballot while there was a timely uploading of the results on the INEC Result Viewing Portal.



Some of the bad remains:

- The incident of violence across the three states resulted in three fatalities in Kogi State and one in Bayelsa.
- Vote buying, abduction and holding of poll official's hostage in some communities in Bayelsa state.
- The discoveries of pre-filled result sheets in Kogi State,
- Results (Form EC8A) uploaded on IReV appeared to have identical handwriting, and results were posted from PUs where the election was alleged not to have occurred.

Based on the alarming issues around result management in Nigeria which historically from 1979 elections has been a major issue, KDI after the off-cycle elections in Imo, Bayelsa and Kogi states embarked on the **Ballot Integrity Project (BIP)** to examine the election results as uploaded on IREV, the project employ a multidisciplinary scientific approach to look at the accuracy, identify gaps, and provide recommendations that INEC can improve on to enhance public trust in the electoral process.

Some Election Integrity Initiative have looked at the consistency of the results released by INEC but a closer look at this shows that there is a need to look further into the elections figures coming from the Polling Units. Evidently, if PU results are manipulated – there is probability that it will translate into the overall election released. These symbolizes BIP as a critical step towards improving the electoral process, by improving the management of election results through a civil society initiative, to ensure that every vote counts and that the democratic will of the people is accurately reflected.

Chapter 2

About the Ballot Integrity Project (BIP)





We believe that transparency is needed to create trust, and it's also needed to create a dialogue.

Julie Sweet


The Ballot Integrity Project (BIP) is a statistical evaluation project focused at improving election results management. The study aims to focus on both regular and unusual trends in vote share distribution, as well as image integrity flaws in election results sheets as uploaded on IREV portal. The main goal is to promote a more transparent, efficient, and reliable election system.

BIP leveraged official figures and or electronic platforms, such as INEC Election Result Viewing Portal (IREV) for data collection and analysis of election results, with the goal of strengthening public trust in the electoral process. By utilizing statistical methods, BIP examines the distribution of votes and turnout figures as well as the analysis of the cumulative vote share of the winning party compared to increasing levels of voter turnout to identify **unusual phases**, indicative of irregularities. Also, the BIP analyzed the distribution of digits in vote count data using **Benford's Law** to discover whether there is empirical evidence indicating vote totals were pre-determined rather than the natural result of credible election processes. Political scientists have employed these methods in dozens of countries over the past decade to identify patterns of irregularity and fraud. Additionally, BIP incorporates qualitative evidence based on examination of results sheets and election observer reports to reveal systematic irregularities, such as the appearance of identical handwriting across multiple results forms.

The objective of BIP focuses on the following:

- To carefully identify any election variabilities through statistical analysis using the information provided on the INEC Result Viewing portal.
- Increase transparency by thoroughly documenting the findings of the election result analysis, the integrity test and make recommendations for future elections.

- Improving the methodology to sustain the same for subsequent election results as a way of providing real time information to the EMB on areas and locations to pay attention to during result collations on election day.



BIP envisions the following outcomes:

- Utilize the data and insights gotten to advocate for electoral reforms that will address the vulnerabilities identified during the analysis.
- Uphold the principles of transparency and accountability in the democratic electoral process.

BIP Methodology and Approach



Benefits of Ballot Integrity Project

The Ballot Integrity Project (BIP) can provide significant benefits to Election Management Bodies (EMBs), Civil Society Organizations (CSOs), and Citizens in the following ways:

Election Management Bodies (EMBs)

- **Early Detection of Irregularities:** BIP’s statistical analysis and examination of election results can help EMBs identify irregularities at an early stage, enabling prompt corrective actions to maintain the integrity of the electoral process.
- **Data Validation:** By leveraging official figures and electronic platforms, BIP contributes to data validation. This assists EMBs in ensuring the accuracy of election results and enhances their confidence in the reliability of the data.



- **Recommendations for Improvement:** BIP's insights and recommendations can serve as valuable inputs for EMBs to improve their processes. This collaborative approach fosters a culture of continuous improvement in election management practices.
- **Public Trust and Transparency:** EMBs benefit from the transparency promoted by BIP, as it helps build and maintain public trust. A transparent electoral process enhances the credibility of EMBs and reinforces their role as impartial custodians of free and fair elections.

Civil Society Organizations (CSOs)

- **Independent Oversight:** BIP, as a CSO initiative, provides independent oversight of the electoral process. CSOs can leverage BIP's findings to hold EMBs accountable and advocate for improvements in electoral systems and procedures.
- **Advocacy and Awareness:** CSOs can use BIP's results to advocate for electoral reforms and raise awareness about the importance of transparent and credible election management. This contributes to informed public discourse on electoral integrity.

Citizens

- **Increased Confidence:** BIP's role in ensuring transparency contributes to citizens' confidence in the electoral process. When citizens trust the integrity of elections, they are more likely to participate and engage in the democratic process.
- **Advocacy and Participation:** Citizens can leverage BIP's findings to advocate for electoral reforms and actively participate in discussions on improving election management. This engagement contributes to the overall health of the democratic system.

Summarily, BIP plays a crucial role in fostering collaboration, accountability, and transparency among EMBs, CSOs, and citizens, ultimately contributing to the integrity and credibility of electoral processes.

Conduct of the Study

BIP coded all the 10,168 form EC8A uploaded on the IReV. Analyzing results from **2,202** PUs in Bayelsa state, **4,556 PUs** in Imo and **3,410 PUs** in Kogi state



Limitation of the Study

As KDI embarked on the BIP to enhance the transparency and integrity of election result management, the journey was not without its contextual boundaries and limitations. Knowing these limiting factors, intrinsic to the research process, play a pivotal role in shaping the understanding and interpretation of the study's outcomes.

- **Data Source Constraints:** Throughout the study phase, the BIP exclusively relied on data sourced from the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV). This data, while valuable, presented inherent limitations such as ineligible writings and blurry upload. Additionally, another inherent factor within this constraint is the assumption that the data housed on IReV realistically reflects the on-the-ground reality—an assumption grounded in the belief that the individuals responsible for data upload are trained INEC officials. This is emphasizing the need to interpret the findings within the constraints of the data source
- **Accreditation Process Nuances:** The study did not capture all the nuances of the accreditation process, such as limitations in BVAS technology or operational challenges at specific polling units; the study only picked the BVAS synchronized figures released on IReV 17 days after election day.
- **Constraints related to time and generalization:** The analysis of the data collection for this study was within a specific timeframe after the election (**14 November 2023 to December 1, 2023**), and the findings were confined to this period. Beyond this timeframe, the analysis did not reflect any changes or updates made on data on IReV after this period. Additionally, caution is needed in universalizing the findings, as the context-specific

nature of elections and challenges in the selected states may differ significantly from other regions, limiting the generalizability of the results.

- **Eventual Findings and Future Implications::** Despite the BIP's commitment to rigorous analysis, it's essential to recognize that election irregularities can be sophisticated and indescribable. Certain forms of gaps may go undetected, and the study might not capture all instances of distortion. Hence, while the study identified irregularities in pattern to provide valuable insights into areas for improvement, the study does not claim to be exhaustive in addressing all possible facets of election result management.

In crisscrossing the landscape of election analysis, the BIP navigated through these contextual boundaries and limitations, shedding light on the complexities inherent in the pursuit of electoral transparency and integrity.



Chapter 3

Key Findings: Examining the Votes in the 2023 Bayelsa, Imo and Kogi off-cycle governorship Elections.



01.

A total of 302 polling units' results were not uploaded to IReV across the three states; INEC only provided an explanation for 75 of these.

In the aftermath of the 2023 Bayelsa, Imo, and Kogi off-cycle governorship election, where election day voting was designated for 10,470 polling units (excluding the 38 and 2 units in Imo and Bayelsa, respectively without registered voters)⁸⁹, a peculiar inconsistency surfaced. Contrary to expectations, the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV) showcases only 10,168 uploaded polling unit results, leaving 302 results conspicuously missing as of the time of this report.

While some may believe that the missing results were simply cancelled, a further examination of the data reveals a more complex narrative. The uploaded results on IReV include instances of form EC40G upload in locations where elections were cancelled either to overvoting, BVAS failure, or violence disruptions, indicating that these anomalies were among the 10,168 results uploaded.




Governorship election - 2023-11-11 - BAYELSA

Result Stats

Total submitted results
2202

Out of 2244

[Refresh](#)



[Recent results](#)

Percentage uploaded
98.13%

Last upload time
Nov 14, 2023, 2:06:18 PM
PU: 06/05/13/043

8 LGAs

- [YENAGOA \(LGA: 08\) - BAYELSA](#)
15 Wards / RA
427 Polling units [Uploaded results: 422](#) [View Wards](#)
- [EKEREMOR \(LGA: 02\) - BAYELSA](#)
12 Wards / RA
258 Polling units [Uploaded results: 253](#) [View Wards](#)
- [SOUTHERN LIAM \(LGA: 07\) - BAYELSA](#)
17 Wards / RA
466 Polling units [Uploaded results: 449](#) [View Wards](#)
- [BACE \(LGA: 01\) - BAYELSA](#)


Governorship election - 2023-11-11 - IMO

Result Stats

Total submitted results
4556

Out of 4758

[Refresh](#)



[Recent results](#)

Percentage uploaded
95.75%

Last upload time
Nov 20, 2023, 10:56:01 AM
PU: 16/11/04/036

27 LGAs

- [ORLU \(LGA: 21\) - IMO](#)
13 Wards / RA
209 Polling units [Uploaded results: 199](#) [View Wards](#)
- [OBOWO \(OTOKO\) \(LGA: 16\) - IMO](#)
10 Wards / RA
128 Polling units [Uploaded results: 123](#) [View Wards](#)
- [OKIGHE \(OKIGHE\) \(LGA: 19\) - IMO](#)
11 Wards / RA
154 Polling units [Uploaded results: 146](#) [View Wards](#)
- [EPINITE MBASE \(LGA: 04\) - IMO](#)


Governorship election - 2023-11-11 - KOGI

Result Stats

Total submitted results
3410

Out of 3508

[Refresh](#)



[Recent results](#)

Percentage uploaded
97.21%

Last upload time
Nov 19, 2023, 2:53:02 PM
PU: 22/04/10/005


21 LGAs

- [ANKPA \(LGA: 03\) - KOGI](#)
13 Wards / RA
292 Polling units [Uploaded results: 290](#) [View Wards](#)
- [OLAMABORO \(LGA: 18\) - KOGI](#)
10 Wards / RA
174 Polling units [Uploaded results: 174](#) **Completed** [View Wards](#)
- [OFU \(LGA: 14\) - KOGI](#)
11 Wards / RA
184 Polling units [Uploaded results: 184](#) **Completed** [View Wards](#)
- [NINNI MANNNON \(LGA: 15\) - KOGI](#)




Although not explicitly addressing the missing results, INEC in response to the pre-filled result sheet controversy in Kogi State took a decisive step by suspending the electoral process in 75 polling units¹⁰. This action implicitly accounted for a fraction of the 302 outstanding results. However, the remaining 227 polling units remain missing on the portal.

Breakdown of the 227 polling units with results missing on the IReV



While the absence of details about these 227 polling units might not sway the overall election outcome significantly, it delves into the core principles of transparency, accountability, and the commitment to open communication between Election Management Bodies (EMBs) and voters.


LGAs in Kogi where polling units results were missing



Note: INEC suspended electoral process in 75 polling units in Kogi State – (Adavi -5, Ajaokuta -5, Ogori/Mangogo – 59, Okehi -1, Okene - 5)




LGAs in Imo where polling units results were missing



Note: Polling units result uploaded in Aboh Mbaise is more than polling unit where election results are expected.

LGAs in Bayelsa where polling units results were missing



02.

Difference in Voter Register's Information: Examining Differences Between INEC's Registered Voter Figures released and Polling Unit Records on Form EC8A.

In the lead-up to the November 11 off-cycle governorship elections in the three states, INEC unveiled the data detailing the total number of registered voters¹¹. However, a meticulous analysis has brought to light some disparities between the registered voter figures reported on Form EC8A in certain polling units and the numbers released by INEC prior to the election.

For instance, in Bayelsa state, Southern Ijaw LGA, Foropa Ward in BOBAI - IDUMU COMM. SQUARE II (06-07-14-004), the total number of registered voters released by INEC was 301. However, the ad-hoc officer on Form EC8A indicated 71.

S/N	STATE	LGA	Registration Area	Polling Unit	Delimitation	No of Registered Voters	No of Collected PVCs	No of Uncollected PVCs
1	BAYELSA	BRASS	BRASS I	TOWN COMMUNITY SCHOOL BUILDING	06-01-01-001	520	506	14
2	BAYELSA	BRASS	BRASS I	GRUNDU OPEN SPACE	06-01-01-003	518	500	14
3	BAYELSA	BRASS	BRASS I	ADA OPEN SPACE	06-01-01-003	1,083	1,064	19
4	BAYELSA	BRASS	BRASS I	AGIP SITE (INDUSTRIAL) OPEN SPACE	06-01-01-004	352	337	15
5	BAYELSA	BRASS	BRASS I	SHIDI COMPOUND OPEN SPACE	06-01-01-005	576	553	23
6	BAYELSA	BRASS	BRASS I	MARKET SQUARE OPEN SPACE	06-01-01-006	355	347	8
1673	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	EAST BOMO II	ATUGBENE OPEN SPACE	06-07-13-017	152	152	0
1674	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	EAST BOMO II	OKIGBENE OPEN SPACE	06-07-13-018	623	623	0
1675	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	EAST BOMO II	TUGOGBENE OPEN SPACE	06-07-13-019	192	192	0
1676	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	EAST BOMO II	AYAMA OPEN SPACE	06-07-13-020	217	217	0
1677	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	EAST BOMO II	DUKUGBENE OPEN SPACE	06-07-13-021	184	184	0
1678	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	EAST BOMO II	MIEGBENE OPEN SPACE	06-07-13-022	143	143	0
1679	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	EAST BOMO II	FIRE BAGBENE OPEN SPACE	06-07-13-023	444	444	0
1680	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	EAST BOMO II	COMMUNITY COMPREHENSIVE SECONDARY SCHOOL KEMEN-AMA	06-07-13-024	32	32	0
1681	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	FOROPA	BINIBELEU OPEN SPACE I	06-07-14-001	561	549	12
1682	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	FOROPA	BINIBELEU OPEN SPACE II	06-07-14-002	419	412	7
1683	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	FOROPA	BOBAI - IDUMU COMM. SQUARE I	06-07-14-003	385	371	14
1684	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	FOROPA	BOBAI - IDUMU COMM. SQUARE II	06-07-14-004	301	292	9
1685	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	FOROPA	KURUBIRI COMM. SQUARE I	06-07-14-005	510	510	0
1686	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	FOROPA	KURUBIRI COMM. SQUARE II	06-07-14-006	274	269	5
1687	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	FOROPA	APIE - IDUMU I	06-07-14-007	422	412	10
1688	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	FOROPA	APIE - IDUMU I	06-07-14-008	259	250	9

Source: <https://inecnigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/Bayelsa-2023-Governorship-PU-PVC-Collection-Figures.pdf>

Similarly, in Kogi state, Olamaboro LGA, Olamaboro III Ward in LGEA Similarly, in Kogi state, Olamaboro LGA, Olamaboro III Ward in LGEA Similarly, in Kogi state, Olamaboro LGA, Olamaboro III Ward in LGEA EDUCATION OFFICE, OKPO (22-18-08-018), the total number of registered voters released by INEC was 222. Nevertheless, the ad-hoc officer on Form EC8A indicated 104.

TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS AND COLLECTED PVCs FOR THE 2023 GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION: KOGI STATE

S/N	STATE	LGA	Registration Area	Polling Unit	Delimitation	No of Registered Voters	No of Collected PVCs	No of Uncollected PVCs
1	KOGI	ADAVI	OKUNCHI/OZURI/ONIEKA	NEAR OPOTUS COMPOUND I	22-01-01-001	240	240	0
2	KOGI	ADAVI	OKUNCHI/OZURI/ONIEKA	NEAR OPOTUS COMPOUND II	22-01-01-002	341	313	28
3	KOGI	ADAVI	OKUNCHI/OZURI/ONIEKA	OPPOSITE OHLUMAI PALACE	22-01-01-003	212	204	8
4	KOGI	ADAVI	OKUNCHI/OZURI/ONIEKA	NEAR ALABI'S HOUSE	22-01-01-004	464	464	0
5	KOGI	ADAVI	OKUNCHI/OZURI/ONIEKA	LGEA SCHOOL OZURI I	22-01-01-005	493	486	7
6	KOGI	ADAVI	OKUNCHI/OZURI/ONIEKA	LGEA SCHOOL OZURI II	22-01-01-006	511	506	5
3144	KOGI	OLAMABORO	OLAMABORO III	CEREMONIAL SQUARE, CEREMONIAL SQUARE	22-18-08-013	1,080	991	89
3145	KOGI	OLAMABORO	OLAMABORO III	OPEN SPACE ALAGALANI JUNCTION, OKPO	22-18-08-014	107	83	24
3146	KOGI	OLAMABORO	OLAMABORO III	OPEN SPACE BESIDE CENTRAL MOSQUE, OKPO	22-18-08-015	83	71	12
3147	KOGI	OLAMABORO	OLAMABORO III	OPPOSITE EID PRAYING GROUND OFUGO, OKPO	22-18-08-016	127	127	0
3148	KOGI	OLAMABORO	OLAMABORO III	OPEN SPACE OFOBODO VILLAGE	22-18-08-017	106	89	17
3149	KOGI	OLAMABORO	OLAMABORO III	LGEA EDUCATION OFFICE, OKPO	22-18-08-018	222	194	28
3150	KOGI	OLAMABORO	OLAMABORO III	OPEN CENTRAL SCHOOL, OKPO	22-18-08-019	206	127	79
3151	KOGI	OLAMABORO	OLAMABORO III	OPEN SPACE BESIDE ONPE MOSQUE	22-18-08-020	184	184	0
3152	KOGI	OLAMABORO	OLAMABORO III	OPEN SPACE UNDER CASHEW TREE, EFAKWU	22-18-08-021	144	139	5

Source: <https://inecnigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/KOGI-2023-Governorship-PU-PVC-Collection-Figures.pdf>

INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF RESULT OF POLL FROM POLLING UNIT
2023 KOGI STATE GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION

Local Government Area: OLAMABORO III
Registration Area: LGEA EDUCATION OFFICE, OKPO

Number of Registered Voters: 222
Number of Collected PVCs: 194

VOTES SCORED:

POLITICAL PARTY	IN FIGURES	IN WORDS
1 A		
2 AAC		
3 AAD		
4 ADP		
5 APC	11	ELEVEN
6 APGA		
7 APM		
8 APP		
9 BP		
10 LP		
11 NNPP		
12 NDM		
13 PDP	04	FOUR
14 PRP	01	ONE
15 SDP	87	EIGHTY SEVEN
16 YPP		
17 ZLP		

TOTAL VALID VOTES: 103

Furthermore, in Imo state, Okigwe LGA, Okigwe I Ward in UMUCHIMA UNITY HALL (16-19-01-013), the total number of registered voters released by INEC was 750. However, the ad-hoc officer on Form EC8A indicated 42.

TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS AND COLLECTED PVCs FOR THE 2023 GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION: IMO STATE

S/N	STATE	LGA	Registration Area	Polling Unit	Delimitation	No of Registered Voters	No of Collected PVCs	No of Uncollected PVCs
1	IMO	ABOH MBAISE	ENYIOGUGU	ALADINMA UMUELEM HALL	16-01-01-001	905	876	29
2	IMO	ABOH MBAISE	ENYIOGUGU	OKWUKU HALL	16-01-01-002	852	825	27
3	IMO	ABOH MBAISE	ENYIOGUGU	UMUNKWO VILLAGE HALL	16-01-01-003	704	672	32
4	IMO	ABOH MBAISE	ENYIOGUGU	IBEKI HALL	16-01-01-004	646	636	10
5	IMO	ABOH MBAISE	ENYIOGUGU	COMMUNITY SCHOOL EZIALA	16-01-01-005	750	737	13
6	IMO	ABOH MBAISE	ENYIOGUGU	EZIALA HALL	16-01-01-006	750	733	17
3128	IMO	OKIGWE	OKIGWE I	IKE ROAD SQUARE II	16-19-01-011	750	715	35
3129	IMO	OKIGWE	OKIGWE I	OKIGWE MASS TRANSIT PARK (CHO GENESS SQ)	16-19-01-012	626	626	0
3130	IMO	OKIGWE	OKIGWE I	UMUCHIMA UNITY HALL	16-19-01-013	750	720	30
3131	IMO	OKIGWE	OKIGWE I	UMULEZEMARO SQUARE	16-19-01-014	36	36	0
3132	IMO	OKIGWE	OKIGWE I	UMUNABIA VILL. HALL	16-19-01-015	24	18	6
3133	IMO	OKIGWE	OKIGWE I	UMUNABIA VILL. HALL	16-19-01-016	41	36	5
3134	IMO	OKIGWE	OKIGWE I	OKORUKAERWE SQUARE	16-19-01-017	540	521	19
3135	IMO	OKIGWE	OKIGWE I	USAHA TOWN HALL	16-19-01-018	538	531	7
3136	IMO	OKIGWE	OKIGWE I	TIMBER HALL	16-19-01-019	548	547	1
3137	IMO	OKIGWE	OKIGWE I	ABAKPA MKT. HALL	16-19-01-020	750	730	20
3138	IMO	OKIGWE	OKIGWE I	FRONT OF GREAT MARY & MARTHA ACADEMY	16-19-01-021	286	276	10
3139	IMO	OKIGWE	OKIGWE I	FRONT OF WINNERS CHAPEL	16-19-01-022	25	19	6
3140	IMO	OKIGWE	OKIGWE I	OKIGWE STADIUM PREMISES	16-19-01-023	373	362	11

Source: <https://inecnigeria.org/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/IMO-2023-Governorship-PU-PVC-Collection-Figures.pdf>

INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF RESULT OF POLL FROM POLLING UNIT
2023 IMO STATE GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION

Local Government Area: OKIGWE I
Registration Area: OKIGWE I
Polling Unit: UMUCHIMA UNITY HALL

Number of Registered Voters: 750
Number of Collected PVCs: 42

VOTES SCORED:


POLITICAL PARTY	IN FIGURES	IN WORDS
1 A		
2 AA	0	
3 AAC		
4 ADC	2	TWO
5 ADP		
6 APC	30	THIRTY
7 APGA	3	THREE
8 APM		
9 APP		
10 BP		
11 LP	4	FOUR
12 NNPP		
13 NDM		
14 PDP	2	TWO
15 PRP		
16 SDP		
17 YPP		
18 ZLP		

TOTAL VALID VOTES: 42

Delving into the extent of these disparities across the registered voter figures reported on Form EC8A in polling units and the numbers released by INEC before the election reveals discrepancies in 46, 185, and 83 polling units in Bayelsa, Imo, and Kogi, respectively. ***This prompts questions about INEC's data management and/or the accuracy of the voter register distributed to poll workers. Are these disparities indicative of possible human errors during the transfer of figures by ad-hoc officers?***



Number of polling units where Registered voter mismatched



In addressing these concerns, INEC should meticulously review its training process and methodology for ad-hoc poll workers. Given that poll workers rely on hard copies of their polling unit voter register, the potential for human errors in transferring figures could be a significant factor contributing to the registered voter discrepancies. This underscores the urgent necessity for comprehensive training of ad-hoc poll workers to maintain the integrity of the electoral process.


Moreover, INEC needs to evaluate its database performance. If poll workers are accessing these numbers through technological devices, any issues related to slow database performance could adversely affect applications and end-users. These considerations become paramount, especially considering stakeholders and organizations questioning the credibility and accuracy of the voter register. Concerns such as over-bloating due to the identification of deceased voters, multiple registrants, and the inclusion of ineligible registrants on the voters' register should be thoroughly examined to fortify the transparency and reliability of the electoral process.



03. Arithmetic Error: Examining Inaccuracies Throughout Three States' Polling Units


Arithmetic errors encompass miscalculations made by polling officers, where the vote share by political parties on Form EC8A do not align with the valid votes written on the same form. Additionally, instances of other calculation errors on Form EC8A, such as ad-hoc poll workers struggling to accurately add together valid votes and rejected votes to determine the total votes cast, have been observed. These errors often coincide with sheet mutilations and raise suspicions regarding the first and last digits.


Arithmetic Error Example(s)



The BIP analyses reveal that arithmetic errors occurred in 130, 409, and 265 polling units in Bayelsa, Imo, and Kogi, respectively. This highlights the scale at which such errors occurred across the three states.

Number of polling units with arithmetic errors Bayelsa, Imo and Kogi States





Addressing the fallout of these arithmetic errors raises concerns about the preparedness or the quality of some of the ad-hoc officials. The circumstances leading to these errors warrant further investigation, with some suggesting that intimidation or pressure during the result sheet-filling process could be contributing factors, while others argue that deficiencies in the training of INEC's ad-hoc poll workers may be a significant factor.

Notwithstanding, if these miscalculations contribute to the figures collated at the ward level and subsequently at the LGA level, it suggests potential inaccuracies or mistakes in the collated election results. Despite Section 65 (1) (c) of the Electoral Act 2022 granting INEC the power to review decisions or returns made, the commission may not be verifying these polling unit results and figures through independent or systemic mechanisms before collation at the ward and LGA levels, leading to announcements and returns.

Section 65 (1) (c) of the Electoral Act 2022: The decision of the returning officer shall be final on any question arising from or relating to— (c) declaration of scores of candidates and the return of a candidate: Provided that the Commission shall have the power within seven days to review the declaration and return where the Commission determines that the said declaration and return was not made voluntarily or was made contrary to the provisions of the law, regulations and guidelines, and manual for the election.

This vulnerability in the current system may mean that irregularities at the polling unit sometimes scale through the audit level at the ward and LGA levels. Furthermore, existing initiatives on Election Result Integrity predominantly may be focusing on verifying collated figures at the ward and LGA levels, without scrutinizing election figures originating from the polling units. Consequently, if polling unit results are manipulated or altered, there is a high probability that such initiatives or checks may endorse those results.

In the context of the seven days provided for INEC to review decisions or returns made by a returning officer, real-time independent verification of polling unit results or verification before the expiration of the seven days becomes imperative to ensure that the voice of the majority prevails. This is crucial as it

directly addresses the core of result management, emphasizing that elections are won and lost at the polling units. Moreso, civil society organizations and election observers must rise to the occasion by employing the BIP methodology and other mechanisms to autonomously verify figures from polling units, actively scrutinizing for any potential alterations and irregularities.



“ At the heart of democracy, elections are lost and won at the sacred polling unit. ”

”



04. Missing Ballots: A Comprehensive Analysis of Simultaneous Accreditation and Voting Processes

In 2019, INEC introduced the Continuous Accreditation and Voting System (CAVS), also known as simultaneous accreditation and voting¹². This decision was based on recommendations from the Commonwealth Observer Mission, which had observed the 2015 general election in Nigeria¹³. The adoption of CAVS aimed to address the issue of possible voter disenfranchisement, which was a concern with the previous voting system where mass accreditation is done and voting commenced later in the afternoon, leading to some voters leaving and not come back to cast their votes.

Several reports by election experts support the notion that CAVS was implemented to ensure a more inclusive voting process. This change sought to encourage voter participation by allowing accreditation and voting to happen


simultaneously, eliminating the need for voters to return later in the day. Additionally, the adoption of CAVS was coupled with the mandatory use of the then SCR (Smart Card Reader), which has since been replaced with BVAS (Bimodal Voter Accreditation System), for the accreditation of voters.

As of the latest available information, the voting procedure in Nigeria adheres to the Continuous Accreditation and Voting System (CAVS), as specified in paragraph 19 of the INEC Regulations and Guidelines 2022 and page 2 of the Manual for Election Officers. This procedure was applied during the




electoral administration of the November 11, 2023, off-cycle governorship elections in Bayelsa, Kogi, and Imo States. Despite the established principle of simultaneous accreditation and voting, **there were observed instances where the number of accredited voters exceeded the total votes cast.** This discrepancy suggests occurrences where individuals were accredited and provided with a ballot paper, yet their votes cannot be accounted for in the final count.

Instances of **accredited voters exceeding the total votes cast (missing ballots)** in Bayelsa, Imo, and Kogi states amount to 4,058, 22,261, and 8,809 ballots, respectively.




Missing Ballots Example(s)




It is noteworthy that this pattern of accredited voters exceeding the total votes cast (missing ballots) has been observed in previous elections, even after the adoption of the Continuous Accreditation and Voting System (CAVS). While there has been a significant reduction in the number of missing ballots following the introduction of CAVS, it is evident that this measure has not completely resolved the issue of having more accredited voters than the total votes cast.


Missing ballot in Osun and Ekiti states' election before Continuous Voting and Accreditation System




Number of ballot paper unaccounted for in the 2019 and 2023 general elections



Number of ballot paper unaccounted for in off-cycle governorship elections from 2020





These persistent discrepancies raise valid concerns about the integrity of the voting process and cast doubt on the accuracy of recorded turnout figures. Several factors could contribute to instances where the number of accredited voters exceeds the total votes cast, leading to missing ballots. Some potential factors according to expert include:

- **Operational Challenges:** Issues with the implementation of the Continuous Accreditation and Voting System (CAVS) may contribute to discrepancies. This could include challenges in the logistics or Human Resources of managing simultaneous accreditation and voting, especially in areas with a high voter turnout. If turnout is overwhelming for poll workers, it can lead to long queues and delays in accessing the voting cubicle.
- **Human Error:** As earlier mentioned, arithmetic errors or mistakes made by election officials, such as errors in recording the total votes cast can contribute to discrepancies. Since there are no mechanism to verify PU results and mistakes in adding may likely be summed up with the election result even at the state collation center. This issue of human errors is something aided by pressure and intimidating atmosphere.
- **Voter Behavior:** Some voters may choose not to cast their votes after accreditation for various reasons, such as dissatisfaction with the candidates or the belief that their votes may not make a difference or intimidation by party supporters.

Nevertheless, further examination and evaluation of the factors contributing to this phenomenon are imperative to ensure a more transparent and reliable electoral system.

05. Over-voting

In the context of Nigerian elections, overvoting occurs when the total number of votes cast at a polling unit exceeds the number of accredited voters in that unit, as explicitly outlined in section 51(2) of the Electoral Act 2022. This scenario indicates that more votes have been recorded than there are eligible voters who participated in the election.

The sum of excess votes where accredited voters were lesser than total votes cast



The analysis conducted by the Ballot Integrity Project (BIP) reveals that instances of overvoting, **where total votes cast surpass accredited voters**, are not only present but also noteworthy. The amounts of valid votes cast in locations where overvoting occurred in Bayelsa, Imo, and Kogi states are documented.

According to the Electoral Act 2022, the prescribed remedy for overvoting is the cancellation of the election results in the affected polling unit, as stipulated in section 51(2).

Electoral Act 2022


Section 51(2) Where the number of votes cast at an election in any polling unit exceeds the number of accredited voters in that polling unit, the Presiding officer shall cancel the result of the election in that polling unit.

Form EC40G showing that elections were canceled in PU 006, Ward 11 in Ofu LGA, Kogi State due to BVAS not Used

In the BIP analysis, it was observed that the situations of cancellation of election result described in the legal framework were established, with instances where poll workers uploaded Form EC40G for places where elections were canceled due to overvoting, BVAS failure or not used, and disruptions from violence. This is indicative that these anomalies were captured in the 10,168 results uploaded on the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV). However, there were specific cases where **total votes cast surpassed accredited voters**, on the form EC8A uploaded -highlighting instances of overvoting that warrant scrutiny and corrective actions.

Secondary data revealed that overvoting at polling units (PUs) can be attributed to various factors, and understanding these factors is crucial for addressing the issue and improving the integrity of the electoral process. Here are some probable reasons for overvoting at PUs:

- **Technical Glitches:** Issues with electronic voting systems or other technical glitches could lead to discrepancies between accredited voters and total votes cast. This can be linked to **inadequate training of ad-hoc poll worker**. If poll worker cannot identify if the BVAS is capturing the data of voters due to inadequately trained on the procedures, discrepancies can occur. Also, poll workers may not have adequate knowledge of the procedures for managing accredited voters and ensuring that the total votes cast do not exceed the accredited count, errors may occur.
- **Intentional Manipulation:** In some cases, overvoting may be a result of intentional manipulation by individuals or groups seeking to influence the outcome of the election.
- **Poor Oversight:** Insufficient supervision and oversight at polling units may



- **Poor Oversight:** Insufficient supervision and oversight at polling units may contribute to irregularities, including overvoting. A lack of checks and balances could enable such discrepancies to go unnoticed.
- **Lack of Voter Education:** Inadequate voter education may lead to voters not fully understanding the electoral process, including the importance of adhering to the accredited voter count. This lack of awareness can contribute to mistakes in the voting booth.
- **Inadequate Security:** Intimidation or interference at polling units may coerce voters into casting multiple ballots, contributing to overvoting.

Addressing overvoting requires a comprehensive approach, including improved voter education, thorough training of poll workers, robust technical infrastructure, and enhanced security measures to ensure the credibility of the electoral process. Additionally, implementing effective oversight mechanisms and addressing systemic issues in the electoral system are essential for preventing overvoting at polling units.




06. Identical Handwriting


The occurrence of identical handwriting across multiple results forms was noticeable in Imo State, specifically in three wards (**OHAEKE/OKPORO**, **EBENESE/UMUEZE/NNACHI IHIOMA**, and **OHAFOR/OKPORO/UMUTANZE**) in Orlu LGA, as well as the presence of multiple forms with the same handwriting in **OGBERURU/OBIBI** ward, raises significant concerns about the authenticity and integrity of the election results in these areas.

Furthermore, in all of the polling units in these wards, the numbers of voters accredited electronically by BVAS, as released by INEC, were conspicuously missing on the IReV platform. This is indicative of the possibility that no BVAS was potentially used, suggesting a potential absence of voting.

Number of polling units affected in each ward



Vote shared per party in the polling unit with same handwriting.



INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF RESULT OF POLL FROM POLLING UNIT
2023 IMO STATE GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION

Local Government Area: OHAEKESIKPORO
Polling Unit: OHAEKESIKPORO

POLITICAL PARTY	IN FIGURES	IN WORDS	NAME/SIGNATURE OF POLLING AGENT
A	0		
AA	0		
AAC	1	ONE	
ADC	0		
ADP	0		
APC	205	TWO HUNDREDS AND FIVE	
APGA	3	THREE	
APM	0		
APP	0		
BP	0		
LP	37	THIRTY-SEVEN	
NNPP	0		
NRM	0		
PDP	0		
PRP	20	TWENTY	
SDP	1	ONE	
YPP	0		
ZLP	0		
TOTAL VALID VOTES	267	TWO HUNDREDS AND SIXTY-SEVEN	

11-11-2023

INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF RESULT OF POLL FROM POLLING UNIT
2023 IMO STATE GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION

Local Government Area: OHAEKESIKPORO
Polling Unit: EBENESE/UMUEZE/NNACHI IHIOMA

POLITICAL PARTY	IN FIGURES	IN WORDS	NAME/SIGNATURE OF POLLING AGENT
1 A	0		
2 AA	1		
3 AAC	0		
4 ADC	0		
5 ADP	1		
6 APC	194	ONE HUNDREDS AND NINETY-FOUR	
7 APGA	3	THREE	
8 APM	0		
9 APP	0		
10 BP	0		
11 LP	39	THIRTY-NINE	
12 NNPP	0		
13 NRM	0		
14 PDP	20	TWENTY	
15 PRP	0		
16 SDP	0		
17 YPP	0		
18 ZLP	0		
TOTAL VALID VOTES	259	TWO HUNDREDS AND FIFTY-NINE	


11-11-2023

INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF RESULT OF POLL FROM POLLING UNIT
2023 IMO STATE GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION

Local Government Area: OHAEKESIKPORO
Polling Unit: OKORORI HALL

POLITICAL PARTY	IN FIGURES	IN WORDS	NAME/SIGNATURE OF POLLING AGENT
1 A	0		
2 AA	0		
3 AAC	0		
4 ADC	0		
5 ADP	0		
6 APC	299	TWO HUNDREDS AND NINETY-NINE	
7 APGA	2	TWO	
8 APM	0		
9 APP	0		
10 BP	0		
11 LP	39	THIRTY-NINE	
12 NNPP	0		
13 NRM	0		
14 PDP	28	TWENTY-EIGHT	
15 PRP	0		
16 SDP	1	ONE	
17 YPP	0		
18 ZLP	0		
TOTAL VALID VOTES	369	THREE HUNDREDS AND SIXTY-NINE	

11-11-2023



This observation suggests the possibility of result manipulation and raises questions about the transparency and fairness of the electoral process in these specific wards. The use of the same handwriting across numerous election results raises several potential concerns and could be indicative of irregularities or manipulation in the electoral process. Some possible reasons for such a situation include:


- Fraudulent Activities:** The most serious concern is the possibility of fraudulent activities, where a single individual or a coordinated group deliberately falsifies multiple results to influence the outcome of the election in favor of a particular candidate or party. The use of identical handwriting may indicate a coordinated effort by a group to manipulate results systematically. This could involve a deliberate attempt to compromise the integrity of the electoral process at various levels.
- Ineffective Election Monitoring:** This could highlight a lack of effective election monitoring and oversight mechanisms during the election. This level of coordinated activities in these wards requires some level of complicity between security, the EMs oversight officials and ad-hoc poll workers. If EM assigned monitors are not monitoring effectively, poll workers can believe they can act with impunity, including the use of identical handwriting to write result sheet
- Intimidation or Coercion:** It could also mean that individuals may be coerced or intimidated into completing results forms in a particular way. This could happen due to external pressures or threats, compromising the independence and fairness of the election. This is linked

to **Inadequate Security**: Weak security measures at polling units may contribute to unauthorized access to election materials, allowing individuals with malicious intent to manipulate results forms.




Moreover, the observation of results being transferred via WhatsApp to polling officers in Igalamela and Ofu LGAs in Kogi state for subsequent upload on IReV adds another layer of scrutiny to the electoral process in these regions.

During expert review meeting, it was noted that the transfer of election results via WhatsApp by INEC officials could be influenced by various factors, such as: **Technical limitation of the BVAS at hand and it could be purely a fraudulent act**, where result was written elsewhere and sent to the poll worker to upload as the result sheet for the PU in question.



Nevertheless, it's important to note that using unofficial and potentially insecure communication channels raises concerns about the process. Aside from some of the factors, others include:

- **Non-Compliance with Electoral Laws:** This action undermines the legal framework designed to ensure a fair and transparent electoral process. Transmitting or transferring election results according to the Electoral Act and INEC Regulations and Guidelines 2022 was using BVAS to snap or scan to IReV and not via WhatsApp. This is a violation of the established procedures.
- **Security Risks:** Transmitting sensitive election data through messaging platforms like WhatsApp exposes it to security threats, such as hacking or unauthorized access. This could compromise the confidentiality and authenticity of the results.
- **Data Integrity:** WhatsApp is not designed as a secure platform for transmitting official and sensitive documents. There is a risk of data corruption or tampering during the transfer process, which could undermine the accuracy and integrity of the election results.




In summary, the transfer of election results via WhatsApp introduces risks that can compromise the credibility of the electoral process, erode public trust, and raise questions about the legitimacy of the election outcomes. It is essential for electoral bodies to uphold secure and transparent communication channels to maintain the integrity of the democratic process.

07.

Examining inconsistencies between IReV and EC8A synchronized accreditation figures (BVAS mismatch)


The commendable release of backend accreditation figures by INEC on IReV is a positive step towards transparency. However, KDI's extraction of this data revealed some disparities between the accredited voters' figures from BVAS released by INEC on IReV and the figures recorded on Form EC8A by ad-hoc officers.

This BIP analysis was conducted in early December and the accreditation figures were extracted 17 days post-election, assuming that backend data synchronization would have been completed by that time.




Legend:

1. – Date Result was uploaded
2. – Date the screenshot was made.
3. – Date of Election as conducted
4. – Accredited voters' figures from BVAS released by INEC
5. – Accredited voters' figures written on Form EC8A from ad-hoc officers.



INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
INEC - HEADQUARTERS
 Plot 436, Zambezi Crescent, Maitama District,
 P.M.B 0184, Abuja, Federal Capital Territory, Nigeria.
 Website: www.inecnigeria.org Online Newspaper: www.inecnews.com



PRESS RELEASE

ALLEGED MANIPULATION OF ACCREDITATION DATA ON IReV

The Independent National Electoral Commission's (INEC) attention has been drawn to some media reports alleging that the Commission was tampering with the accredited figures of voters in the Kogi Governorship Election results uploaded on the INEC Result Viewing (IReV) portal. However, these reports are unfounded.


For the avoidance of doubt, the most accurate and up-to-date Voters' Accreditation Data is available in the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS), which is used for the authentication and accreditation of registered voters at various polling units on election day. It automatically retains the accreditation data of all voters.

The BVAS is designed to primarily work offline without Internet connectivity, which facilitates faster and seamless authentication and accreditation experience for voters. However, when its application is active or in use, depending on the strength of its connection to the Internet, the BVAS automatically exports the accreditation data to the Accreditation Backend System (ABS).

This exportation of data does not happen when the device's application is inactive or when the internet connectivity is poor. The same experience applies to a situation where more than one BVAS gadget is used at a polling unit with more than 1,250 registered voters. This could be compared to a situation when poor network services delay the delivery of an SMS sent from one individual to another through a mobile phone.

At the close of poll, Presiding Officers are expected to press the data exportation button on the BVAS to ensure that all the accreditation data are exported to the ABS. This process, referred to as synchronization and which is ongoing, could lead to changes in the accreditation figures as more data flow in to update the existing figures. This is the basis for the caveat provided on the IReV portal, regarding the accreditation figures. The accreditation data cannot be changed on the BVAS after the close of poll.

The public should disregard the misleading report and misinformation.



Mohammed Kudu Haruna
 National Commissioner and Member
 Information and Voter Education Committee
 Tuesday 14th November 2023

It's noteworthy that, as of mid-December, the accredited voters' figures from BVAS on IReV were removed.

The subsequent tabulation of the data revealed discrepancies at some polling units, where the number of accredited voters on Form EC8A did not align with the electronically accredited figures released by INEC on IReV. This incongruity underscores the importance of scrutinizing and ensuring consistency in the data made available to the public. Oyetola vs Adeleke 2022.


Number of PUs where BVAS accreditation figures and BVAS mismatched



The BIP team conducted a detailed analysis of valid votes in polling units (PUs) where synchronized accreditation figures on IReV were inconsistent with the accreditation figures on Form EC8A. Here are the key findings:




Valid votes from PUs where synchronized accreditation figures on IREV were inconsistent in Bayelsa State




In Bayelsa state, **46,448** of the total number of valid votes cast were gotten from the PUs where the number of accredited voters on Form EC8A did not align with the electronically accredited figures released by INEC on IREV.

Furthermore, the analysis looked at only the subset of valid votes cast from PUs where the number of accredited voters reported on EC8A forms exceeded the number reported by BVAS by 100 or more votes (to exclude cases of error or synching). Looking only at this subset, there are **39,910** valid votes cast from PUs where EC8A reported accreditation was 100 or more votes in excess of accreditation reported by BVAS.





Valid votes from PUs where synchronized accreditation figures on IREV were inconsistent in Kogi State




In Kogi state, **318,056** of the total number of valid votes cast were gotten from the PUs where the number of accredited voters on Form EC8A did not align with the electronically accredited figures released by INEC on IREV.



Furthermore, the analysis looked at only the subset of valid votes cast from PUs where the number of accredited voters reported on EC8A forms exceeded the number reported by BVAS by 100 or more votes (to exclude cases of error or synching). Looking only at this subset, there are **253,756** valid votes cast from PUs where EC8A reported accreditation was 100 or more votes in excess of accreditation reported by BVAS.




Valid votes from PUs where synchronized accreditation figures on IREV were inconsistent in Imo State




In Imo state, a significant portion of the total valid votes, totaling **331,820**, was derived from polling units (PUs) where the number of accredited voters on Form EC8A did not align with the electronically accredited figures released by INEC on IReV.

Further scrutiny was applied by narrowing the analysis to a subset of valid votes cast from PUs where the number of accredited voters reported on EC8A forms exceeded the number reported by BVAS by 100 or more votes. This revealed a total of **237,866** valid votes cast from PUs where EC8A reported accreditation was 100 or more votes in excess of accreditation reported by BVAS. This nuanced exploration sheds light on specific instances of discrepancies in the accreditation and voting process within Imo state.



Inconsistency in Synchronized Accreditation Figures on IReV across Political Parties In Imo State



Afterwards, BIP analysis moved to examining the spread of this incongruity of BVAS Accreditation Mismatch. In Imo, the nodes on the plots represent polling units at the point of intercept between voter turnout and percentage (%) of votes shared by APC, PDP, and LP. The nodes on orange represent PUs where the number of accredited voters reported on the form EC8A did not match the number of voters accredited electronically by BVAS as displayed on IReV.







APC in these PUs got 80 – 100% of the votes shared in these PUs. While PDP and LP in these PUs had less than 20% of votes shared. There were PUs that were part of normal distribution where BVAS was also mismatched.


NOTE: Turnout over 100% were excluded. Also, nulls on % APC, %PDP and %LP were excluded from the analyzed data.

The same analysis was conducted for each Local Government Area (LGA) in Imo, revealing diverse patterns in different LGAs. Highly unusual distributions were noted with red circles. This intricate examination provides insights into the nuanced discrepancies within the accreditation and voting process across these states.




Inconsistency in Synchronized Accreditation Figures on IReV per LGA based on Votes Shared by APC In Imo State







Inconsistency in Synchronized Accreditation Figures on IReV across Political Parties In Kogi State



In the graphical representation, each node denotes a polling unit at the intersection of voter turnout and the percentage of votes shared by APC, PDP, and SDP. The orange nodes specifically highlight polling units where the number of accredited voters reported on Form EC8A did not align with the number of voters accredited electronically by BVAS, as displayed on IReV. Notably, a large size of these specific PUs, APC received 90–100% of the shared votes, while PDP and SDP received less than 10% of the shared votes. This graphical analysis points towards distinctive patterns in these PUs, suggesting a correlation between accreditation discrepancies and the distribution of votes among political parties.


Inconsistency in Synchronized Accreditation Figures on IReV per LGA based on Votes Shared by APC In Kogi State






The scenario in Bayelsa exhibits similarities, where the orange nodes denote polling units (PUs) with discrepancies between the number of accredited voters reported on Form EC8A and those accredited electronically by BVAS, as displayed on IReV. In these PUs, APC received 90–100% of the shared votes, while PDP and LP received less than 10% of the shared votes. Conversely, PUs represented by blue nodes, where BVAS did not show a mismatch, follow a normal distribution, with PDP receiving 45–98% of shared votes and APC getting 2–50% of shared votes. This analysis suggests distinct patterns in PUs with accreditation mismatches, emphasizing the correlation between discrepancies and the distribution of votes among political parties.

Inconsistency in Synchronized Accreditation Figures on IReV across Political Parties In Bayelsa State



The same analysis, as demonstrated above, was conducted for each Local Government Area (LGA) in Bayelsa, unveiling diverse patterns across different LGAs. The presence of highly unusual distributions, marked by orange circles, becomes apparent. When these circles overlap with clusters of orange PUs, it suggests a more pronounced indication of potential malfeasance. This nuanced examination at the LGA level allows for a more granular understanding of irregularities and their impact on specific regions within Bayelsa.

Inconsistency in Synchronized Accreditation Figures on IReV per LGA based on Votes Shared by APC In Bayelsa State



Implicatively, this pattern does not mean absolutely that intentional manipulation or fraud, might involve inflating or deflating the number of accredited voters to influence the election outcome at the polling unit level led to these discrepancies. This is only a pointer, and prompt call for thorough investigations by relevant authorities. Because ensuring transparency and accountability becomes crucial to maintain public trust at this point, owing to credibility concerns.

Other factors that could contribute to the discrepancies between the number of accredited voters reported on Form EC8A and those accredited electronically by BVAS, as displayed on IReV include:

- **Poor Database Management:** Issues with database management and technical malfunctions in the Accreditation Backend System (ABS) could lead to inaccuracies in the electronically recorded accreditation figures. Issues such as slow synchronization of data between BVAS and IReV, connectivity problems, software bugs, or hardware failures might contribute to these discrepancies. **Nevertheless, many have asked if these technical issues were not fixed within the first 17 days post-election day.**
- **Human Error:** Ad-hoc poll workers or election officials might make errors when manually recording the number of accredited voters on Form EC8A. This could include mistakes in data entry, miscalculations, or oversight during the hectic election process.
- **Training Gaps:** Insufficient training of ad-hoc poll workers on the proper use of BVAS and accurate recording of data on Form EC8A could result in discrepancies. Proper training is crucial to ensure that election officials understand and adhere to the correct procedures.


It is important for INEC to demonstrate commitment to enhancing the overall integrity of the electoral process by investigating the specific circumstances surrounding the discrepancies to determine the root cause and implement corrective measures. It will involve a comprehensive audit, collaboration between relevant stakeholders.



08.

Examining the Uncertainty around the Usage of BVAS

The BIP Team extracted the accreditation figures on IReV seventeen (17) days post-election, it became evident that certain polling units exhibited a concerning trend. **In these units, the numbers of voters accredited electronically by BVAS, as released by INEC, were conspicuously absent on the IReV platform.** Notably, this pattern was exclusive of polling units with zero registered voters.



Legend:


1. Date Result was uploaded
2. Date the screenshot was made.
3. Accredited voters' figures from BVAS released by INEC is missing

Such an issue raises questions about the actual utilization of BVAS in these instances, suggesting the possibility that election did not hold in this polling unit. Yet, there is a result from this location. Another pattern discovered is that most of the PUs where same handwriting on form EC8A also falls where BVAS accreditation figures released by INEC were missing on IReV. **For instance, 16 PUs in OHAEKE/OKPORO, 12 PUs in EBENESE/UMUEZE/NNACHI IHIOMA, 16 PUs in OGBERURU/OBIBI and 18 PUs in OHAFOR/OKPORO/UMUTANZE in**




EBENESE/UMUEZE/NNACHI IHIOMA, 16 PUs in OGBERURU/OBIBI and 18 PUs in OHAFOR/OKPORO/UMUTANZE in Orlu LGA falls in this category. Given all these, BIP analysis moved to identify PUs where there is high likelihood of BVAS not been used.


Number of polling units where BVAS was likely not used




Number of polling units per LGAs in Bayelsa State where there are likelihood of BVAS not used.




Number of polling units per LGAs in Imo State where there are likelihood of BVAS not used.




Number of polling units per LGAs in Kogi State where there are likelihood of BVAS not used.




The BIP team conducted an exhaustive analysis to extract the valid votes in polling units (PUs) where synchronized accreditation figures on IReV were absent, indicating a potential non-usage of BVAS.




In Imo state, **95,820** valid votes originated from polling units (PUs) where potentially BVAS was not used, suggesting a potential scenario where voting might not have taken place. Similarly, in Bayelsa state, **50,040 valid** votes were recorded in PUs where BVAS was not utilized, indicating a possible absence of voting. In Kogi State, **18,249** valid votes were reported from PUs where potentially BVAS was not used, implying a potential situation where voting may not have occurred




Representation of BVAS Not Used across Political Parties in Relation to their votes in Bayelsa






Representation of BVAS Not Used across Political Parties in Relation to their votes in Kogi




Representation of BVAS Not Used across Political Parties in Relation to their votes in Imo



In Imo State, the analysis of polling unit (PU) results on IREV indicates a normal distribution, primarily concentrated at the bottom of the chart, with most PUs exhibiting a turnout range of 10–30% and a vote share for APC between 30–80%. However, an anomalous cluster of PUs appear at the top right of the chart, characterized by both high turnout and APC vote share exceeding 80%. **Additionally, the chart shows some red nodes – these nodes represent PUs where no BVAS was potentially used, suggesting a potential absence of voting.** Further to this, the red nodes are concentrated more at the top right where irregular cluster is found.

Analyzing PDP vote share and turnout does not reveal any suspicious patterns, although there is a peculiar cluster at the top left, where PUs with 90%+ turnout and 0-5% for PDP are concentrated. This cluster is also heavily populated by PUs where BVAS was likely not used, consistent with the identified pattern of fraud favoring APC in other visuals. Similarly, an analysis of LP vote share and turnout does not show any suspicious patterns, but there is an unusual



concentration at the top left, where PUs with 90%+ turnout and 0-10% for LP are clustered. This pattern is also heavily populated by PUs where BVAS was likely not used, aligning with the identified pattern in other visuals.

In Bayelsa, the analysis of PU results on IREV for Bayelsa State displays a normal distribution primarily at the bottom of the chart, with most PUs clustered within a turnout range of 10–50% and a vote share for APC between 10–50%. However, a highly irregular cluster of PUs emerges at the top right, characterized by both high turnout and APC vote share exceeding 90%. Analyzing PDP vote share and turnout does not reveal any suspicious patterns, although there is a distinctive cluster at the top left, where PUs with 90%+ turnout and 0-5% for PDP are concentrated. This pattern aligns with other visuals.

In Kogi, the analysis of PU results on IREV for Kogi State indicates a normal distribution primarily at the bottom of the chart, with most PUs clustered within a turnout range of 10–60% and a vote share for APC between 0–60%. However, a highly irregular cluster of PUs appears at the top right, characterized by turnout greater than 80% and APC vote share exceeding 90%.



09.

Unmasking the Direction of Irregular Clusters- A Statistical Analysis


Political scientists have provided an array of methods for detecting election irregularities, including statistical outliers, irregularities in vote-share distributions, Benford's Law, and machine learning techniques. Notable fraud-detection methods involve analyzing political party vote share and voter turnout, examining cumulative winning party vote share and voter turnout, and studying the distribution of digits in the vote count data¹⁴.


BIP utilized three statistical analyses:

- Irregularities in Vote Share Distribution (Cluster Detection)
- Cumulative Number of Votes as a Function of Turnout (Boost Phase Analysis)
- Benford's Law

Cluster Detection


One way to visualize is through two-dimensional histograms of the number of units for a given voter turnout (x axis) and the percentage of votes (y axis) for the winning party (or candidate). Color represents the number of units with corresponding vote and turnout numbers. The units usually cluster around a given turnout and vote percentage level. In Uganda and Russia, these clusters are smeared out to the upper right region of the plots, reaching a second peak at a 100% turnout and 100% of votes (red circles).





The BIP methodology, employed by KDI, conducted a comprehensive analysis of the November 11, 2023, off-cycle governorship elections in Bayelsa, Imo, and Kogi States. The findings reveal a notable cluster that extends to the upper part of the distribution chart, reminiscent of similar patterns observed in the elections in Uganda and Russia.


Statistical Detection of Potential Election Irregularities - Imo State




Statistical Detection of Potential Election Irregularities - Kogi State



Statistical Detection of Potential Election Irregularities - Bayelsa State



NOTE: Turnout over 100% were excluded. Also, nulls on % APC, %PDP and %LP were excluded from the analyzed data.




The presence of a second peak at 100% turnout and close to 100% vote share in the two-dimensional histograms signifies an unusual pattern in the distribution of voter turnout and vote share in the three states. Unlike a typical scenario where the distribution forms a cluster around a specific turnout and vote percentage, the appearance of a second peak, particularly at the maximum values (red circles), raises concerns and may be considered indicative of electoral irregularities.

This abnormal pattern, reminiscent of similar irregularities observed in elections in Uganda and Russia, prompts a critical examination of the underlying factors contributing to this phenomenon. **The question arises: Why is there a second peak at 100% turnout and close to 100% vote shared?**


Potential Explanations to this question from Expert Review include:

- **Potential Manipulation or Fraud:** The presence of a second peak suggests the possibility of manipulation or fraud in certain polling units. Free and fair elections rarely exhibit such a peak, as achieving 100% turnout and near-unanimous support for a single party is highly uncommon.
- **Forced or Inflated Results:** It could indicate instances where certain polling units experienced forced or inflated voter turnout and vote share, leading to an unnatural concentration of data points at the maximum values.
- **Irregular Voting Practices:** Anomalies in voter turnout and vote share may be linked to irregularities during the voting process, such as ballot stuffing or other forms of manipulation that result in an exaggerated distribution at the maximum values.
- **Systemic Issues:** This pattern might highlight systemic issues within the electoral process, including inadequate checks and balances, lack of transparency, or compromised integrity in specific areas.


Furthermore, the BIP methodology, as applied by KDI, extended its analysis to previous governorship off-cycle elections, specifically the 2022 Ekiti and Osun States elections. The objective was to examine whether there were irregular clusters like those observed in the last governorship elections in Imo, Kogi, and Bayelsa States, where allegations of irregularities were prevalent.



APC PDP VOTE SHARE IN 2022 EKITI STATE OFFCYCLE GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION




APC PDP VOTE SHARE IN 2022 OSUN STATE OFFCYCLE GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION




Upon conducting the two-dimensional histogram analysis for Ekiti State, the results demonstrated a normal distribution cluster around a given turnout and vote percentage level, with no observable smear at any corner. Similarly, the analysis for Osun State revealed a normal distribution cluster around a specific turnout and vote percentage level, without any distinctive smear at any corner. In both cases, the nodes outside the normal distribution were identified as random outliers, not indicative of pre-conceived malpractices.

The absence of irregular clusters in the two-dimensional histograms for Ekiti and Osun States, in contrast to the distinct patterns observed in Imo, Kogi, and Bayelsa States, further underscores the unique nature of the latter elections. The emergence of a second peak at 100% turnout and close to 100% vote share in the last governorship elections calls for thorough investigation, as it deviates significantly from the expected distribution in a fair and transparent electoral process.




Cumulative Number of Votes as a Function of Turnout (Boost Phase Analysis)

Following a method established in the seminal piece *Statistical Detection of Election Irregularities* (Klimek et al, 2012), “One way to visualize the intensity of election irregularities is the cumulative number of votes as a function of the turnout.




For each turnout level, the total number of votes from units with this level or lower is shown. Each curve corresponds to the respective election winner in a different country with average electorate per unit of comparable order of magnitude. **Usually, these cumulative distribution functions level off and form a plateau from the party’s maximal vote count. Again, this result is not the case for Russia and Uganda. Both show a boost phase of increased extreme fraud toward the right end of the distribution (red circles).”**

The application of the cumulative number of votes as a function of the turnout to APC vote share in Imo, Kogi, and Bayelsa, where APC emerged as the winner in Imo and Kogi, reveals an extreme boost phase in all three states. This boost phase is strongly indicative of high-intensity election irregularities that favored the APC.



In Imo, the APC experienced a significant surge from 50% to 75% of the vote, based solely on polling units with 90% or more turnout. Similarly, in Kogi, the APC's vote share increased from 23% to 55%, relying exclusively on polling units with 90% or more turnout. Even in Bayelsa, where the APC did not emerge victorious, the party still saw an increase from 25% to 45% based solely on polling units with 90% or more turnout.

This pattern of a sharp increase in APC vote share in high-turnout polling units raises concerns that require careful examination. The boost phase observed in these states highlights the need for thorough investigations and corrective measures to address potential irregularities and uphold the transparency and fairness of future elections.





Benford's Law.

Benford's Law describes the distribution of leading digits in diverse datasets. This law states that the occurrence of the initial digits (1, 2, 3, ..., 9) in a variety of datasets is not statistically more likely. Smaller numerals, like 1, are more likely to appear as the first digit than larger digits, such as 9.

In simpler terms, when you analyze a large dataset and look at the first digit of each number, you would expect to see more numbers starting with 1, followed by a decreasing likelihood for digits 2, 3, and so on, up to 9. This phenomenon is counterintuitive because our common perception might be that each digit should occur with an equal chance. However, Benford's Law has been found to apply to various datasets, including financial transactions and population numbers.


The practical implication of Benford's Law is that if a dataset deviates significantly from the expected distribution under this law, it might indicate that the

Benford's Law Expected Values

First Digit	Probability
1	30.1%
2	17.6%
3	12.5%
4	9.7%
5	7.9%
6	6.7%
7	5.8%
8	5.1%
9	4.6%
Total	100%

data has been manipulated or is not naturally occurring. This makes it a useful tool in detecting anomalies or irregularities in large sets of numerical data. In the context of election analysis, Benford's Law is employed by comparing the observed frequency of first digits (1 to 9) in voting precincts or election results with the expected distribution based on Benford's Law. Significant deviations from the expected distribution might raise questions about the integrity of the election results. However, it's important to note that while Benford's Law can be a useful tool, it is not foolproof, and deviations from the expected distribution do not conclusively prove fraud.


In the analysis conducted by BIP, which focused on the first digit of the vote share by APC, and they categorized



this digit into different turnout buckets in polling units (PUs). Here are some key findings from their analysis:


Turnout 0-50%:

The first digit frequency in PUs with 0-50% turnout was generally close to the expected value. However, there were significant deviations observed in Imo and Bayelsa, where the frequency of 1 as the first digit was lower than the expected value by 11 and 8 points, respectively.



Turnout 30-60%


- In PUs with 30-60% turnout, the first digit frequency was very close to the expected value.
- A significant deviation was noted in Bayelsa, where the frequency of 1 as the first digit was lower than the expected value by 13 points.





Turnout 90-100%

- There were high disparities between the digit frequency of 4, 5, 6, and the expected frequency in the three states in PUs with 90-100% turnout.
- The difference in the expected frequency of 1 as the first digit was over 15 points in Imo, almost 25 points in Kogi, and 17 points in Bayelsa.



These findings suggest irregularities in the distribution of first digits, particularly in PUs with higher turnout. Significant deviations from the expected distribution, as observed in Imo, Kogi, and Bayelsa, raise concerns and warrant further investigation into the integrity of the election results in these states.

Meeting with INEC

Following the BIP analysis, the team met the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) on February 19, 2023, to discuss the findings of the analysis. During this meeting, the BIP team presented their comprehensive findings and shared insights regarding the suspicious trends, disparities in elections result figures on IReV and result management issues identified during the November 11, 2023, off-cycle governorship elections in Bayelsa, Imo, and Kogi States. As of the time of releasing the BIP report, we await INEC response regarding the presented findings.

We understand the importance of continued engagement and collaboration between election monitoring entities, civil society, and electoral management bodies to address and rectify identified challenges, fostering transparency and accountability in the electoral process. Given the forgoing, we will keep engaging with INEC towards taking appropriate actions based on the BIP's findings to strengthen the integrity of future elections in Nigeria.



Chapter 4

Recommendations



Below are set of recommendations for different stakeholders to enhance transparency in result management and improve the overall election result management framework:

Election Management Bodies (EMBs), Specifically INEC:

1. **Comprehensive Post-Election Audits:** Institute a robust and transparent post-election audit process that involves thorough scrutiny of election results, with a focus on identifying and rectifying any inconsistencies, arithmetic errors, or irregularities.
2. **Public Release of Backend Data:** Maintain a commitment to transparency by consistently releasing backend data, including accredited voter figures, on platforms like IReV, allowing independent analysts and civil society organizations to verify and validate the data.
3. **Investigate and Address Electoral Anomalies:** Establish mechanisms for prompt and impartial investigation of identified irregularities, including over-voting, missing ballots, and discrepancies in accreditation figures. Take appropriate actions based on investigation outcomes.
4. **Establish a Reporting Channel:** Establish an escalation channel for reporting irregularities spotted either by citizen, CSOs and or Media – these can help check and balances in result management before declaring a candidate return.
5. **Review and Strengthen Training Programs:** Conduct periodic reviews of the training programs for ad-hoc staff, with a specific focus on addressing issues related to arithmetic errors, result sheet filling, and adherence to established procedures. Furthermore, the trained ad-hoc staff should be engaged, there are school of thoughts that believe sometimes these ad-hoc staff are replaced prior to election and after training them.
6. **Leverage Technology for Accreditation and Voting:** Explore ways to further improve the use of technology in the accreditation and voting process, ensuring that systems like BVAS are effectively utilized to minimize discrepancies and enhance the accuracy of recorded turnout figures.



Civil Society Organizations and Election Observers:

1. **Adopt and Promote Best Practices:** Best practices, such as the BIP methodology, to independently cross-check figures from polling units and identify potential alterations or irregularities should be embraced and promoted.
2. **Capacity Building:** The capacity of election observers and civil society organizations should be strengthened in data analysis, allowing them to conduct more effective and detailed scrutiny of election results.
3. **Collaborate and Share Findings:** Foster collaboration among civil society organizations, election observers, and other stakeholders to share findings, pool resources, and collectively advocate for electoral transparency and integrity.

Political Parties:

1. **Promote Ethical Conduct:** Political parties are encouraged to prioritize ethical conduct and adherence to electoral laws, emphasizing the significance of a fair and transparent electoral process.
2. **Monitor Internal Processes:** Implement internal mechanisms to monitor and evaluate the conduct of party agents and officials during elections, with a focus on ensuring compliance with established procedures.
3. **Engage in Voter Education:** Collaborate with relevant stakeholders to engage in voter education initiatives, emphasizing the importance of transparent and credible elections.

Legislators and Policymakers:

1. **Enact Electoral Reforms:** Actively participate in the review and amendment of electoral laws to address identified gaps and enhance the overall transparency and integrity of the electoral process.
2. **Support Technology Integration:** Advocate for the responsible integration of technology in the electoral process, ensuring that systems are secure, reliable, and contribute to the accuracy of election results.



- 3. Ensure Implementation of Recommendations:** Monitor the implementation of recommendations from election observation reports, independent analyses, and audit findings, holding relevant authorities accountable for addressing identified issues.

These recommendations collectively aim to create a more transparent, accountable, and inclusive electoral environment, fostering public trust in the democratic process.



Appendix



1. <https://www.pnas.org/doi/epdf/10.1073/pnas.1210722109>
2. <https://aceproject.org/ace-en/topics/ei/onePage>
3. Ani Casimir, Emma Omeh, Chinedu Ike (2013), Electoral Fraud in Nigeria: A Philosophical Evaluation of the Framework of Electoral Violence, Open Journal of Political Science 2013. Vol.3, No.4, 167-174. <http://dx.doi.org/10.4236/ojps.2013.34023>
4. ibid
5. Mack, V. (2016). The Fingerprints of Fraud: an In-depth Study of Election Forensics with Digit Tests.
6. Peter Klimeka, Y. Y. (2012, October 9). Statistical detection of systematic election irregularities. Retrieved from PNAS: <https://www.pnas.org/doi/epdf/10.1073/pnas.1210722109>
7. Stoetzer, V. M. (2019). Election fraud, digit tests and how humans fabricate vote counts - An experimental approach, Electoral Studies, <https://doi.org/10.1016/j.electstud.2018.12.002>. (<https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0261379418302488>), Volume 58, Pages 31-47,.
8. <https://www.vanguardngr.com/2023/11/full-list-off-cylcle-elections-40-polling-units-where-elections-wont-hold-in-imo-inec/>
9. <https://x.com/inecnigeria/status/1722180971917635605?t=5UEMWyic2Dj-cL9jeUn8iw&s=08>
10. <https://x.com/inecnigeria/status/1723758224023691519?t=QNPGx5Kx8TQFSFm7zBfw&s=08>
11. https://inecnigeria.org/?page_id=12995
12. <https://ptcij.org/blog/challenges-and-solutions-for-a-free-and-credible-electoral-process/>
13. <https://dailypost.ng/2019/02/12/2019-elections-adopted-simultaneous-accreditation-voting-inec/>
14. <https://www.pnas.org/doi/pdf/10.1073/pnas.1210722109>

Registered Voters Mismatch Sample

TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS AND COLLECTED PVCs FOR THE 2023 GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION: BAYELSA STATE

S/N	STATE	LGA	Registration Area	Polling Unit	Delimitation	No of Registered Voters	No of Collected PVCs	No of Uncollected PVCs
1	BAYELSA	BRASS	BRASS 1	TOWN COMMUNITY SCHOOL BUILDING	06-01-01-001	520	506	14
2	BAYELSA	BRASS	BRASS 1	GBUNDU OPEN SPACE	06-01-01-002	514	500	14
3	BAYELSA	BRASS	BRASS 1	ADA OPEN SPACE	06-01-01-003	1,083	1,064	19
4	BAYELSA	BRASS	BRASS 1	AGIP SITE (INDUSTRIAL) OPEN SPACE	06-01-01-004	352	337	15
5	BAYELSA	BRASS	BRASS 1	SHIDI COMPOUND OPEN SPACE	06-01-01-005	576	553	23
6	BAYELSA	BRASS	BRASS 1	MARKET SQUARE OPEN SPACE	06-01-01-006	355	347	8
1673	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	EAST BOMO II	AYOUGBENE OPEN SPACE	06-07-13-017	152	152	0
1674	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	EAST BOMO II	OKIGBENE OPEN SPACE	06-07-13-018	623	623	0
1675	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	EAST BOMO II	TUGOGBENE OPEN SPACE	06-07-13-019	192	192	0
1676	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	EAST BOMO II	AYAMA OPEN SPACE	06-07-13-020	217	217	0
1677	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	EAST BOMO II	DUKUGBENE OPEN SPACE	06-07-13-021	184	184	0
1678	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	EAST BOMO II	MIEGBENE OPEN SPACE	06-07-13-022	143	143	0
1679	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	EAST BOMO II	FIRE BAGBENE OPEN SPACE	06-07-13-023	444	444	0
1680	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	EAST BOMO II	COMMUNITY COMPREHENSIVE SECONDARY SCHOOL KEMEIN-AMA	06-07-13-024	32	32	0
1681	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	FOROPA	BINIBELEU OPEN SPACE I	06-07-14-001	561	549	12
1682	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	FOROPA	BINIBELEU OPEN SPACE II	06-07-14-002	419	412	7
1683	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	FOROPA	BOBAI - IDUMU COMM. SQUARE I	06-07-14-003	385	371	14
1684	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	FOROPA	BOBAI - IDUMU COMM. SQUARE II	06-07-14-004	301	292	9
1685	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	FOROPA	KURUBIRI COMM. SQUARE I	06-07-14-005	510	510	0
1686	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	FOROPA	KURUBIRI COMM. SQUARE II	06-07-14-006	274	269	5
1687	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	FOROPA	APIE - IDUMU I	06-07-14-007	422	412	10
1688	BAYELSA	SOUTHERN IJAW	FOROPA	APIE - IDUMU I	06-07-14-008	259	250	9

INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF RESULT OF POLL FROM POLLING UNIT
2023 BAYELSA STATE GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION

S/N: 0001684
FORM EC BA

State: BAYELSA
Local Government Area: SOUTHERN IJAW
Registration Area: FOROPA
Polling Unit: BOBAI - IDUMU COMM. SQUARE II

Code: 0 0 6
Code: 0 7
Code: 1 4
Code: 0 0 4

		VOTES SCORED		NAME/SIGNATURE OF POLLING AGENT
S/N	POLITICAL PARTY	IN FIGURES	IN WORDS	
1	A	—	—	
2	AA	—	—	
3	ADC	—	—	
4	ADP	—	—	
5	APC	34	Thirty four	Stemene E. Johnson
6	APGA	—	—	
7	APM	—	—	
8	APP	—	—	
9	BP	—	—	
10	LP	—	—	
11	NNPP	—	—	
12	NRM	—	—	
13	PDP	—	—	
14	PRP	—	—	
15	SDP	—	—	
16	ZLP	—	—	
17		—	—	

TOTAL VALID VOTES (RECORD TOTAL VALID VOTES UNDER #7 ABOVE): 71

I, FAJADE ENOLA (Name of Presiding Officer) hereby certify that the information contained in this Form is a true and accurate account of votes cast in this Polling Unit and that the election was CONTESTED/NOT CONTESTED

Stamp/Signature of Presiding Officer: FAJADE ENOLA
DATE: 12/11/2023

TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS AND COLLECTED PVCs FOR THE 2023 GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION: KOGI STATE

S/N	STATE	LGA	Registration Area	Polling Unit	Delimitation	No of Registered Voters	No of Collected PVCs	No of Uncollected PVCs
1	KOGI	ADAVI	OKUNCHI/OZURI/ONIEKA	NEAR OPOTUS COMPOUND I	22-01-01-001	240	240	0
2	KOGI	ADAVI	OKUNCHI/OZURI/ONIEKA	NEAR OPOTUS COMPOUND II	22-01-01-002	341	313	28
3	KOGI	ADAVI	OKUNCHI/OZURI/ONIEKA	OPPOSITE OHUMAHU PALACE	22-01-01-003	212	204	8
4	KOGI	ADAVI	OKUNCHI/OZURI/ONIEKA	NEAR ALABI'S HOUSE	22-01-01-004	464	464	0
5	KOGI	ADAVI	OKUNCHI/OZURI/ONIEKA	LGEA SCHOOL OZURI I	22-01-01-005	493	486	7
6	KOGI	ADAVI	OKUNCHI/OZURI/ONIEKA	LGEA SCHOOL OZURI II	22-01-01-006	511	506	5
7	KOGI	ADAVI	OKUNCHI/OZURI/ONIEKA	NEAR OZURI MOSQUE	22-01-01-007	421	414	7
3144	KOGI	OLAMABORO	OLAMABORO III	CEREMONIAL SQUARE, CEREMONIAL SQUARE	22-18-08-013	1,080	991	89
3145	KOGI	OLAMABORO	OLAMABORO III	OPEN SPACE ALAGALANI JUNCTION, OKPO	22-18-08-014	107	83	24
3146	KOGI	OLAMABORO	OLAMABORO III	OPEN SPACE BESIDE CENTRAL MOSQUE, OKPO	22-18-08-015	83	71	12
3147	KOGI	OLAMABORO	OLAMABORO III	OPPOSITE EID PRAYING GROUND OFUGO, OKPO	22-18-08-016	127	127	0
3148	KOGI	OLAMABORO	OLAMABORO III	OPEN SPACE OFOBOBO VILLAGE	22-18-08-017	106	89	17
3149	KOGI	OLAMABORO	OLAMABORO III	LGEA EDUCATION OFFICE, OKPO	22-18-08-018	222	194	28
3150	KOGI	OLAMABORO	OLAMABORO III	LGEA CENTRAL SCHOOL, OKPO	22-18-08-019	166	127	39
3151	KOGI	OLAMABORO	OLAMABORO III	OPEN SPACE BESIDE OKPE MOSQUE	22-18-08-020	184	184	0
3152	KOGI	OLAMABORO	OLAMABORO III	OPEN SPACE UNDER CASHEW TREE, EFAKWU	22-18-08-021	144	139	5

INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF RESULT OF POLL FROM POLLING UNIT
2023 KOGI STATE GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION FORM EC 8A
 S/N: 3149


State: KOGI
 Local Government Area: OLAMABORO
 Registration Area: OLAMABORO III
 Polling Unit: LGEA EDUCATION OFFICE, OKPO

Code 022
 Code 18
 Code 08
 Code 018

1. Number of Voters on the Register	104
2. Number of Accredited Voters	104
3. Number of Ballot Papers Issued to the Polling Unit	222
4. Number of Unused Ballot Papers	118
5. Number of Spoiled Ballot Papers	NIL
6. Number of Rejected Ballots	AFR 1
7. Number of Total Valid Votes (Total Valid Votes cast for all parties)	103
8. Total Number of Used Ballot Papers (Total of #5 + #6 + #7 above)	104

S/N	POLITICAL PARTY	VOTES SCORED		NAME / SIGNATURE OF POLLING AGENT
		IN FIGURES	IN WORDS	
1	A	—	—	
2	AA	—	—	
3	AAC	—	—	
4	ADC	—	—	
5	ADP	—	—	
6	APC	11	ELEVEN	SULE IBRAHIM
7	APGA	—	—	
8	APM	—	—	
9	APP	—	—	
10	BP	—	—	
11	LP	—	—	
12	NNPP	—	—	
13	NRM	—	—	
14	PDP	04	FOUR	USMAN YAKUBU
15	PRP	01	ONE	
16	SDP	87	EIGHTY SEVEN	GOWON VICTOR
17	YPP	—	—	
18	ZLP	—	—	
TOTAL VALID VOTES		103	ONE HUNDRED AND THREE	

I, **IDUH BARTHOLOMEW** (Name of Presiding Officer) hereby certify that the information contained in this form is true and accurate account of votes cast in this Polling Unit and that the election was CONTESTED / NOT CONTESTED.



TOTAL NUMBER OF REGISTERED VOTERS AND COLLECTED PVCs FOR THE 2023 GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION: IMO STATE

S/N	STATE	LGA	Registration Area	Polling Unit	Delimitation	No of Registered Voters	No of Collected PVCs	No of Uncollected PVCs
1	IMO	ABOH MBAISE	ENYIOGUGU	ALADINMA UMUELEM HALL	16-01-01-001	905	876	29
2	IMO	ABOH MBAISE	ENYIOGUGU	OKWUAKU HALL	16-01-01-002	852	825	27
3	IMO	ABOH MBAISE	ENYIOGUGU	UMUNKWO VILLAGE HALL	16-01-01-003	704	672	32
4	IMO	ABOH MBAISE	ENYIOGUGU	IBEKU HALL	16-01-01-004	646	636	10
5	IMO	ABOH MBAISE	ENYIOGUGU	COMMUNITY SCHOOL EZIALA	16-01-01-005	750	737	13
6	IMO	ABOH MBAISE	ENYIOGUGU	EZIALA HALL	16-01-01-006	750	733	17
3128	IMO	OKIGWE	OKIGWE I	IKE ROAD SQUARE II	16-19-01-011	750	715	35
3129	IMO	OKIGWE	OKIGWE I	OKIGWE MASS TRANSIT PARK (CHO GENESIS SQ II)	16-19-01-012	675	625	50
3130	IMO	OKIGWE	OKIGWE I	UMUCHIMA UNITY HALL	16-19-01-013	750	720	30
3131	IMO	OKIGWE	OKIGWE I	FRONT OF ROYAL MESSENGERS ACADEMY	16-19-01-014	92	70	22
3132	IMO	OKIGWE	OKIGWE I	UMUEZEEMARO SQUARE	16-19-01-015	24	18	6
3133	IMO	OKIGWE	OKIGWE I	UMUNABIA VILL. HALL	16-19-01-016	41	36	5
3134	IMO	OKIGWE	OKIGWE I	OKOROUKAEKWE SQUARE	16-19-01-017	540	521	19
3135	IMO	OKIGWE	OKIGWE I	UBAHA TOWN HALL	16-19-01-018	538	531	7
3136	IMO	OKIGWE	OKIGWE I	TIMBER HALL	16-19-01-019	548	547	1
3137	IMO	OKIGWE	OKIGWE I	ABAKPA MKT. HALL	16-19-01-020	750	730	20
3138	IMO	OKIGWE	OKIGWE I	FRONT OF GREAT MARY & MARTHA ACADEMY	16-19-01-021	286	276	10
3139	IMO	OKIGWE	OKIGWE I	FRONT OF WINNERS CHAPEL	16-19-01-022	25	19	6
3140	IMO	OKIGWE	OKIGWE I	OKIGWE STADIUM PREMISES	16-19-01-023	373	362	11

INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF RESULT OF POLL FROM POLLING UNIT
2023 IMO STATE GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION

State: IMO
 Local Government Area: OKIGWE
 Registration Area: OKIGWE I
 Polling Unit: UMUCHIMA UNITY HALL

SN: IG/000310
 FORM EC

1. Number of Voters on the Register: 42
 2. Number of Accredited Voters: 42
 3. Number of Ballot Papers Issued to the Polling Unit: 100
 4. Number of Unused Ballot Papers: 59
 5. Number of Spoiled Ballot Papers: NIL
 6. Number of Rejected Ballots: NIL
 7. Number of Total Valid Votes (Total Valid Votes cast for all parties): 42
 8. Total Number of Used Ballot Papers (Total of #5 + #6 + #7 above): 42

S/N	POLITICAL PARTY	VOTES SCORED		NAME/SIGNATURE OF POLLING AGENT
		IN FIGURES	IN WORDS	
1	A			
2	AA	0	=	
3	AAC			
4	ADC	2	TWO	
5	ADP			
6	APC	30	THIRTY	
7	APGA	3	THREE	
8	APM			
9	APP			
10	BP			
11	LP	4	FOUR	
12	NNPP			
13	NRM			
14	PDP	2	TWO	O.G
15	PRP			
16	SDP			
17	YPP			
18	ZLP			
TOTAL VALID VOTES (Sum of Total Valid Votes under #7 above)		42	FOURTY TWO	

I, **ESD** (Presiding Officer) hereby certify that the above is a true and accurate account of votes cast in this polling Unit and that the

2023 Imo State Governorship Election: 16-19-01-013

Arithmetic Error Sample 1

INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF RESULT OF POLL FROM POLLING UNIT
2023 BAYELSA STATE GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION

em

State: BAYELSA Local Government Area: OGBIA Registration Area: OKODI Polling Unit: OTUKURU - EMADIKE

S/N: 00000000000000000000
FORM EC 8A
Code: 0 0 6
Code: 0 5
Code: 0 5
Code: 0 1 7

1. Number of Voters on the Register	424
2. Number of Accredited Voters	18
3. Number of Ballot Papers Issued to the Polling Unit	424
4. Number of Unused Ballot Papers	-
5. Number of Spoiled Ballot Papers	0
6. Number of Rejected Ballots	2
7. Number of Total Valid Votes (Total Valid Votes cast for all parties)	422
8. Total Number of Used ballot Papers (Total of #5 + #6 + #7 above)	424

S/N	POLITICAL PARTY	VOTES SCORED		NAME/SIGNATURE OF POLLING AGENT
		IN FIGURES	IN WORDS	
1	A		NIL	
2	AA		NIL	
3	ADC		NIL	
4	ADP		NIL	
5	APC	176	One hundred and seventy six	Emmanuel Oloche
6	APGA		NIL	
7	APM		NIL	
8	APP		NIL	
9	BP		NIL	
10	LP	3	Three	MAMUNA Oloche
11	NNPP		NIL	
12	NRM		NIL	
13	PDP	244	Two hundred forty four	Esali Udochi
14	PRP		NIL	
15	SDP		NIL	
16	ZLP		NIL	
17			NIL	

TOTAL VALID VOTES
(RECORD TOTAL VALID VOTES UNDER #7 ABOVE)

Emmanuel Oloche (Name of Presiding Officer) hereby certify that the information contained in this Form is a true and accurate account of votes cast in this Polling Unit and that the election was CONTESTED/NOT CONTESTED

Stamp/Signature of Presiding Officer: 11/11/2023

Arithmetic Error Sample 2



INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF RESULT OF POLL FROM POLLING UNIT
2023 IMO STATE GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION

State: IMO SN: IG/0001889
 Local Government Area: IKEDURU FORM EC 8A
 Registration Area: UZOAGBA Code 0 1 6
 Polling Unit: COMM. SCH. UMUEME Code 0 8
 Code 1 2
 Code 0 0 1

1. Number of Voters on the Register	
2. Number of Accredited Voters	820
3. Number of Ballot Papers Issued to the Polling Unit	499
4. Number of Unused Ballot Papers	820
5. Number of Spoiled Ballot Papers	321
6. Number of Rejected Ballots	Nil
7. Number of Total Valid Votes (Total Valid Votes cast for all parties)	Nil
8. Total Number of Used Ballots Papers (Total of #5 + #6 + #7 above)	499 499

S/N	POLITICAL PARTY	VOTES SCORED		NAME/SIGNATURE OF POLLING AGENT
		IN FIGURES	IN WORDS	
1	A	—		
2	AA	—		
3	AAC	—		
4	ADC	—		
5	ADP	—		
6	APC	390	THREE HUNDRED AND NINETY	Chief Olanis
7	APGA	2	TWO	Chief Smeke
8	APM	—		
9	APP	—		
10	BP	—		
11	LP	5	FIVE	Chief Donald
12	NNPP	—		
13	NRM	—		
14	PDP	2	TWO	Chief Obinna
15	PRP	—		
16	SDP	—		
17	YPP	—		
18	ZLP	—		

TOTAL VALID VOTES
 (Record Total Valid Votes under #7 above)

I, OLANWOLA ADEJINA (Name of Presiding Officer) hereby certify that the information contained in this form is a true and accurate account of votes cast in this polling Unit and that the election was NOT CONTESTED

Arithmetic Error Sample 3



INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTIONS COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF RESULT OF POLL FROM POLLING UNIT
2023 KOGI STATE GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION

State: KOGI
Local Government Area: KOGI, K. K.
Registration Area: KOTONKARFE SOUTH EAST
Polling Unit: LGEA SCH. COMP., OSUKU

Code 022
Code 11
Code 03
Code 007



1. Number of Voters on the Register	884
2. Number of Accredited Voters	786
3. Number of Ballot Papers Issued to the Polling Unit	891
4. Number of Unused Ballot Papers	508
5. Number of Spoiled Ballot Papers	1
6. Number of Rejected Ballots	0
7. Number of Total Valid Votes (Total Valid Votes cast for all parties)	2386
8. Total Number of Used Ballot Papers (Total of #5 + #6 + #7 above)	2387

S/N	POLITICAL PARTY	VOTES SCORED		NAME / SIGNATURE OF POLLING AGENT
		IN FIGURES	IN WORDS	
1	A	0	ZERO	
2	AA	0	ZERO	Abdulkarim Abubakar
3	AAC	0	ZERO	
4	ADC	1	ONE	
5	ADP	3	THREE	
6	APC	217	TWO HUNDRED AND SEVENTEEN	Abubakar U. Fankar
7	APGA	0	ZERO	
8	APM	0	ZERO	Hussaini Umar
9	APP	0	ZERO	Hussaini Yusuf
10	BP	0	ZERO	
11	LP	0	ZERO	
12	NNPP	0	ZERO	
13	NRM	0	ZERO	
14	PDP	2	TWO	Huss. Muhammad
15	PRP	0	ZERO	
16	SDP	163	ONE SIXTY THREE	Hussaini Shaibu Marikud
17	YPP	0	ZERO	Hussaini Muhammad
18	ZLP	0	ZERO	Muhammad Oibiri
TOTAL VALID VOTES <small>(Based total valid votes under #7 above)</small>		2386	TWO THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY SIX	

I, MALIQI SALISU USMAN (Name of Presiding Officer) hereby certify that the information contained in this form is a true and accurate account of votes cast in this Polling Unit and that the election was CONTESTED / NOT CONTESTED

Signature of Presiding Officer

Sample result sent via WhatsApp



Missing Ballot Sample 1



INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF RESULT OF POLL FROM POLLING UNIT
2023 BAYELSA STATE GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION

S/N:0002115
FORM EC 8A

State BAYELSA Code 006
Local Government Area YENAGOA Code 08
Registration Area GBARAIN I Code 07
Polling Unit EKEWARI PRIMARY SCHOOL Code 002

1. Number of Voters on the Register	629
2. Number of Accredited Voters	629
3. Number of Ballot Papers Issued to the Polling Unit	606
4. Number of Unused Ballot Papers	337
5. Number of Spoiled Ballot Papers	3
6. Number of Rejected Ballots	2
7. Number of Total Valid Votes (Total Valid Votes cast for all parties)	258
8. Total Number of Used ballot Papers (Total of #5 + #6 + #7 above)	263

S/N	POLITICAL PARTY	VOTES SCORED		NAME/SIGNATURE OF POLLING AGENT
		IN FIGURES	IN WORDS	
1	A			
2	AA			
3	ADC	5	FIVE	
4	ADP	1	ONE	
5	APC	63	SIXTY-THREE	Wilson Livinus
6	APGA			
7	APM			
8	APP			
9	BP			
10	LP			ANA DEW BRITON
11	NNPP			
12	NRM			
13	PDP	189	ONE HUNDRED AND EIGHTY-NINE	Ahaji Genesis
14	PRP			
15	SDP			
16	ZLP			
17				

TOTAL VALID VOTES
(RECORD TOTAL VALID VOTES UNDER #7 ABOVE) TWO HUNDRED AND FIFTY-EIGHT

I, GIFT GEOFFREY (Name of Presiding Officer) hereby certify that the information contained in this Form is a true and accurate account of votes cast in this Polling Unit and that the election was CONTESTED/NOT CONTESTED

Stamp/Signature of Presiding Officer
GIFT GEOFFREY
DATE 11/11/2023

Missing Ballot Sample 2



INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF RESULT OF POLL FROM POLLING UNIT
2023 IMO STATE GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION

State: IMO SN: IG/0000281
 Local Government Area: AHLAZU MBAISE FORM EC 8A
 Registration Area: OKIRIKA NWENKWO
 Polling Unit: CIVIC HALL UMEZUO

1. Number of Voters on the Register			
2. Number of Accredited Voters			1316
3. Number of Ballot Papers Issued to the Polling Unit			1316
4. Number of Unused Ballot Papers			1122
5. Number of Spoiled Ballot Papers			
6. Number of Rejected Ballots			
7. Number of Total Valid Votes (Total Valid Votes cast for all parties)			182
8. Total Number of Used Ballot Papers (Total of #5 + #6 + #7 above)			182

S/N	POLITICAL PARTY	VOTES SCORED		NAME/SIGNATURE OF POLLING AGENT
		IN FIGURES	IN WORDS	
1	A	1	ONE	
2	AA	11	ELEVEN	
3	AAC	=	=	
4	ADC	2	TWO	
5	ADP	1	ONE	
6	APC	59	FIFTYNINE	
7	APGA	3	THREE	
8	APM	2	TWO	
9	APP	=	=	
10	BP	=	=	
11	LP	47	FORTYSEVEN	
12	NNPP	=	=	
13	NRM	=	=	
14	PDP	55	FIFTY FIVE	
15	PRP	=	=	
16	SDP	=	=	
17	YPP	=	=	
18	ZLP	=	=	
TOTAL VALID VOTES <small>(Record Total Valid Votes under #7 above)</small>		182	ONE EIGHTY TWO	

I, IHEJIRIKA CHIDMA-C (Name of Presiding Officer) hereby certify that the information contained in this form is a true and accurate account of votes cast in this polling Unit and that the election was CONTESTED/NOT CONTESTED

[Signature] 11/11/2023
 Date: 11/11/2023

Missing Ballot Sample 3



INDEPENDENT NATIONAL ELECTORAL COMMISSION
STATEMENT OF RESULT OF POLL FROM POLLING UNIT
2023 KOGI STATE GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION

FORM EC 8A
S/N: 1834

State: KOGI Code: 022
 Local Government Area: KABBA/BUNU Code: 10
 Registration Area: ODO-APE Code: 14
 Polling Unit: POSTAL AGENCY II Code: 008

1. Number of Voters on the Register	750
2. Number of Accredited Voters	750
3. Number of Ballot Papers Issued to the Polling Unit	750
4. Number of Unused Ballot Papers	537
5. Number of Spoiled Ballot Papers	1
6. Number of Rejected Ballots	1
7. Number of Total Valid Votes (Total Valid Votes cast for all parties)	212
8. Total Number of Used Ballot Papers (Total of #5 + #6 + #7 above)	213

S/N	POLITICAL PARTY	VOTES SCORED		NAME / SIGNATURE OF POLLING AGENT
		IN FIGURES	IN WORDS	
1	A			S. OBAMOH
2	AA			Joseph
3	AAC	-1-	ONE	
4	ADC	-13-	Thirteen	Abraham...
5	ADP			
6	APC	-129-	ONE hundred twenty nine	S. OBAMOH
7	APGA	-1-	ONE	
8	APM			
9	APP			
10	BP			
11	LP			
12	NNPP			
13	NRM			
14	PDP	-66-	Sixty six	Obafemi Joseph
15	PRP			
16	SDP	-2-	Two	
17	YPP			
18	ZLP			
TOTAL VALID VOTES <small>(record total valid votes under #7 above)</small>		212	Two hundred twelve	

I, Olukenmode Bisola (Name of Presiding Officer) hereby certify that the
 contained in this form is a true and accurate account of votes cast in this Polling Unit and that the election was
CONTESTED / NOT CONTESTED

Sign/Stamp of Presiding Officer



No 53 A.N. AMOSU Avenue, NAF Valley
Estate, Behind Abacha Barracks, Asokoro,
FCT, Abuja, Nigeria..

Aresa Close, Gbodofon Area, Behind Union
Bank, Aregbe, Osogbo. Osun State.

Email:

info@kimpact.org.ng

Phone:

+2348103947690, +2349020118336

www.kimpact.org.ng

