



KIMPACT
DEVELOPMENT
INITIATIVE

POST-ELECTION STATEMENT

***on the 2026 Ekiti State
Governorship Election***

June 2026.

INTRODUCTION



In a bid to ensure a comprehensive, data-driven assessment of the 2026 Ekiti State Governorship Election, Kimpact Development Initiative (KDI) established a dedicated Election Day Data Room (EDDR) on June 19, 2026. This Election Day Data Room served as the central hub for coordinating, verifying, and analysing real-time observation reports. It provided a structured workflow that linked data from the field to decision-makers, partners, and the public.

For the Ekiti 2026 governorship election, the EDDR deployed a scientifically grounded observation framework that enabled real-time and inferential analysis of electoral conduct across the 177 registration areas in Ekiti State. With the KDI's 9jaTalks reporting application, 198 trained observers across the 177 RAs and 16 local government areas (LGAs) submitted live updates, which were verified and analysed by KDI's data analysis team. The EDDR worked collaboratively with domestic and international observer groups to strengthen verification and ensure accuracy. This statement presents KDI's post-election assessment of the election based on reports received from field observers and data analysis conducted by the EDDR.

OVERALL ASSESSMENT

KDI observed that the 2026 Ekiti State off-cycle Governorship Election was conducted in a largely peaceful and orderly environment across the state. Election administration functioned well in most observed locations, and security deployment contributed to maintaining public order throughout the voting process. Although KDI documented pockets of incidents relating to voter inducement, operational delays, technical challenges, and isolated security and political party interference in the electoral process, these incidents did not appear sufficiently widespread to fundamentally disrupt the conduct of the election.

Moreso, the election largely validated the findings of KDI's pre-election Election Security Risk Assessment (ESRA), which projected that the principal threats to electoral credibility would arise less from widespread violence and more from integrity-related pressures capable of affecting voter confidence, voter choice, and public trust in the process. The election demonstrates that peaceful elections and credible elections are related but distinct concepts. While the Ekiti 2026 governorship election largely avoided widespread violence, concerns relating to vote trading, operational consistency, and electoral technology performance remained evident in several locations.





KEY FINDINGS


ELECTION ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS

KDI observed that election materials generally arrived in good condition across the state, with most polling units receiving the required materials for accreditation and voting. Additionally, KDI observed that the polls commenced on schedule in most polling units observed by KDI across the state. Based on verified reports analyzed by the Election Day Data Room, 80.5% of observed polling units commenced accreditation and voting within KDI’s operational benchmark of 8:45 am, while 19.5% commenced later than the benchmark. The concentration of delayed commencement was observed mostly in LGAs such as Oye, Ado-Ekiti, Ekiti East, and Ikere.




ACCREDITATION, VOTING AND BVAS PERFORMANCE

Commencement Status Breakdown



Functionality of BVAS




Accreditation and voting commenced on schedule in most polling units observed by KDI. Where delays occurred, they were largely linked to polling unit setup challenges and technical issues involving the Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS), personnel deployment, field coordination, and election-morning operational management.


BVAS functioned successfully in most observed polling units, with KDI recording a functionality rate of 82.6%. While this indicates that the technology generally supported voter accreditation, the 82.6% performance falls below the benchmark established by INEC in recent off-cycle governorship elections observed by KDI. For context, KDI recorded BVAS functionality rates exceeding 96% during the 2025 Anambra Governorship Election. The Ekiti figures therefore suggest a decline in technological performance relative to recent electoral experience. This distinction is important: the issue is not that BVAS failed across the state; rather, the technology appears to have performed below the standard established in previous off-cycle governorship elections. In some instances, there were follow-up reports that the technical challenges were eventually resolved.

VOTE TRADING AND VOTERS' INDUCEMENT

Vote Trading Actors



Vote Trading by LGA



The most significant electoral integrity concern documented by KDI during the election was voter inducement and vote trading. KDI received reports relating to alleged voter inducement and vote-trading activities across 13 Local Government Areas. Reports were most concentrated in Ekiti East, Ikole, Ado-Ekiti, Moba, Emure, and Ijero LGAs.

The most frequently reported actors involved in voter inducement were party agents and party supporters, with the most reported inducement amount ranging between ₦7,001 and ₦10,000, while KDI also received reports of the distribution of food items and other material incentives. The findings suggest that transactional mobilisation remains a significant feature of recent elections in Nigeria and continues to pose risks to voter autonomy and democratic accountability. While KDI solely relied on observer reporting, the volume, geographical spread, and consistency of reports indicate that voter inducement remains one of the most pressing threats to electoral integrity in Nigeria's off-cycle elections.

SECURITY DEPLOYMENT AND CONDUCT



Security personnel were present in most observed polling locations and generally discharged their responsibilities professionally. Their deployment contributed significantly to maintaining a peaceful election environment and limiting the escalation of localised tensions. At the same time, 13.7% of the reports received by KDI in the data room were related to alleged security interference across 15 LGAs and received a limited number of allegations linking security personnel to environments where vote-trading activities were reported. While these incidents represented a minority of observations, they highlight the importance of maintaining both the reality and public perception of security neutrality during elections. No fatalities were recorded among incidents verified through KDI's Election Day Data Room.


ELECTION-RELATED VIOLENCE

KDI recorded 13 verified incidents of election-related violence across the state, resulting in over thirty documented victims. The incidents included physical assaults, intimidation, harassment, group clashes, and one reported ballot-snatching incident.


Table 1: Type of Verified Electoral Violence Incidents

Incident Type	Number of Incidents	Percentage of Total Incidents
Physical Assault	7	53.8%
Group Clash	2	15.4%
Intimidation and Harassment	3	23.1%
Ballot Snatching	1	7.7%
Total	13	100.0%

LGA Violence Incidents Breakdown



Violence Incidents types




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Physical assaults accounted for more than half (53.8%) of all verified violence incidents, and incidents involving organised clashes and intimidation collectively represented 30.8% of all incidents. Ballot snatching was rare, with only one verified occurrence statewide, and the security agencies apprehended this individual. The election violence profile in the 2026 Ekiti election suggests that mild interpersonal confrontations and targeted intimidation were more prevalent than direct attacks on election materials or polling infrastructure.

Table 2: Verified Electoral Violence Incidents by LGA

LGA	Number of Incidents	Share of Total Incidents
Ado-Ekiti	7	53.8%
Moba	2	15.4%
Oye	1	7.7%
Ekiti East	1	7.7%
Ikole	1	7.7%
Ekiti West	1	7.7%
Total	13	100.0%



Although KDI verified 13 election-related violence incidents across six LGAs, more than half occurred in Ado-Ekiti alone. This concentration indicates that electoral violence during the Ekiti Governorship Election was localised and cluster-based rather than widespread across the state. The pattern aligns with KDI's pre-election risk assessment, which projected isolated flashpoints rather than generalised election-day violence.

BALLOT INTEGRITY AND RESULTS MANAGEMENT



Through its Ballot Integrity Project (BIP), KDI conducted a preliminary review of polling-unit result uploads on the INEC Result Viewing Portal (IReV), focusing on result publication patterns, voter-register consistency, and election-day results management procedures. KDI observed that approximately 98% of polling-unit result sheets were available on the IReV by midnight on Election Day. This represents the most important safeguards for public confidence in Nigeria’s electoral process.

However, KDI’s preliminary review identified a few issues that warrant further institutional clarification and administrative review. Firstly, KDI observed an apparent disconnect between the time polling-unit processes were completed and the time corresponding results became visible on the IReV portal. Analysis of upload patterns indicates that the first polling-unit result became visible on IReV at approximately **4:09 pm** on Election Day. However, by **6:00 p.m.**, only about **21%** of polling-unit results had been published on the portal, despite the fact that voting, counting, and result declaration had already been concluded in many polling units. **Notably, KDI observed a pronounced surge in uploads from 6:00 p.m. onwards, with a substantial volume of polling-unit results appearing on the IReV portal within a compressed**

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timeframe. This pattern suggests that results were published in a concentrated bulk upload after 6:00 p.m., rather than being uploaded progressively as polling-unit processes were concluded, as envisaged under the BVAS result transmission process.

While this demonstrates substantial publication of results within a relatively short timeframe, KDI observed cases where the timestamp associated with a polling-unit result on IReV appeared significantly later than the completion of counting and sorting activities observed at the polling unit. For example, reports received from observers indicated that voting, sorting, and counting activities at St. Michael Primary School, Water Works Area I (Polling Unit 13/01/04/001), Ward Ado 'D' Ijigbo, Ado-Ekiti Local Government Area, were concluded around 3 pm - several hours before the corresponding result became visible on IReV, which carried a creation timestamp of approximately 10:00 pm.

KDI is unable to determine whether such differences reflect network-related delays, backend processing timelines, synchronisation procedures, batch uploads, or other administrative factors. Nevertheless, greater public clarity regarding how result uploads are processed and reflected on IReV would strengthen transparency and help manage public expectations, particularly ahead of more politically competitive elections. As Nigeria approaches the 2027 General Elections, delays between polling-unit result completion and public visibility on IReV may generate unnecessary suspicion, misinformation, and tension if stakeholders do not clearly understand the operational processes involved. KDI therefore encourages INEC to provide additional public guidance on the technical workflow governing result uploads and publication timelines.

Secondly, KDI observed that the operational implementation of electronic result transmission remains insufficiently understood by electoral stakeholders. While Section 60(3)-(5) of the Electoral Act provides for the electronic transmission and transfer of results by the presiding officer from each PU to the IReV portal and such transmission shall be done after the prescribed Form EC8A has been signed and stamped by the Presiding officer and/or countersigned by the candidates or Polling agents. The practical relationship between polling-unit uploads, collation procedures, and contingency arrangements remains unclear to many stakeholders. During the Ekiti Governorship Election, collation processes continued to rely primarily on physical Form EC8A result sheets, while limited public information was available regarding instances of communication failure, upload delays, or alternative transmission procedures. Greater transparency in this area would strengthen confidence in election results management.

Thirdly, KDI observed discrepancies between voter-registration figures announced before the election and figures announced during the formal collation process. Prior to the election, INEC announced that Ekiti State had 1,059,360 registered voters.

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
However, figures announced during Local Government collation and state-level aggregation produced a cumulative registered-voter figure of 988,251.

KDI is unable at this stage to determine the precise source of this discrepancy. Possible explanations may include differences between voter-register extracts used for election administration and figures announced during collation, data-entry errors, aggregation inconsistencies, or other administrative factors. Nevertheless, the recurrence of similar discrepancies across several off-cycle elections observed under KDI's Ballot Integrity Project suggests the need for a comprehensive administrative review of voter-register management, election-day data reporting procedures, and quality-control mechanisms.

Finally, KDI observed a variance between the total number of accredited voters and the total number of votes cast. According to figures announced by INEC, 384,940 voters were accredited, while 382,109 votes were cast, producing a difference of 2,831 ballots.

Based on KDI's preliminary assessment, the issues identified do not appear sufficiently significant to affect the overall outcome of the election. Nevertheless, they highlight areas where improvements in data management, results administration, operational transparency, and quality assurance would strengthen electoral integrity and public trust. KDI therefore encourages INEC to undertake a post-election administrative review of these issues and to use the findings to further strengthen Nigeria's electoral results-management architecture ahead of future elections.





CONCLUSION: THE PRESSURE BENEATH THE PEACE

The 2026 Ekiti State Governorship Election demonstrates that the principal threats to electoral credibility in Nigeria are increasingly evolving beyond widespread election-day violence. While the election was conducted in a largely peaceful environment, KDI's observations indicate that issues relating to voter autonomy, institutional transparency, election technology, and public confidence remain important determinants of electoral integrity.


The findings from this election largely validate KDI's pre-election assessment that the greatest pressures on the electoral process would emerge from integrity-related concerns rather than large-scale security threats. The Ekiti experience therefore highlights the need for electoral stakeholders to broaden reform efforts beyond violence prevention and focus more deliberately on strengthening transparency, accountability, voter confidence, and trust in electoral institutions.

As preparations begin for the Osun Governorship Election and the 2027 General Elections, the central lesson from Ekiti is clear: peaceful and credible elections are mutually reinforcing. While efforts to prevent election violence remain essential, equal attention must be given to safeguarding the integrity, transparency, and credibility of the electoral process. Credible elections foster public trust, reduce post-election disputes and litigation, and ultimately contribute to a more peaceful and stable democratic process.



#ExitDecides2026 Voter Statistics

Estimated Population	4.2 Million	2026 16	Registration Area	177
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RECOMMENDATIONS

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To the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC)

1. Conduct a comprehensive post-election administrative audit of voter-register management, collation procedures, and election-day data reporting processes to identify and address discrepancies in voter statistics. In addition, INEC should ensure that the Register of Voters (RV) figure is pre-printed on the EC8A Polling Unit Result Sheet before Election Day to eliminate manual entry errors, enhance data integrity, and improve consistency in election results management.
2. Strengthen pre-election testing, certification, and quality assurance procedures for BVAS devices, particularly with respect to facial recognition and biometric authentication challenges experienced by elderly voters.
3. Improve election-day logistics coordination and personnel deployment systems to reduce uneven operational performance across LGAs.
4. Publish comprehensive public guidance on the operational workflow for electronic result management, including polling-unit result uploads, publication timelines, contingency arrangements for network disruptions, and the implementation of Sections 60(3)–(5) of the Electoral Act.

To Security Agencies

1. Sustain the professional conduct demonstrated during the Ekiti election while strengthening internal oversight mechanisms to address allegations of interference and preserve public confidence in security neutrality.
2. Enhance intelligence-led monitoring and enforcement efforts targeting voter inducement, vote-buying networks, and other electoral offences that undermine voter autonomy.
3. Intensify real-time arrests and prosecution referrals of electoral offenders caught in the act on election day, particularly those involved in vote trading and inducement, to strengthen deterrence and demonstrate consequences for electoral offences.
4. Prioritise early identification and management of localised electoral flashpoints in future elections.

To Political Parties and Candidates

1. Refrain from voter inducement, vote buying, and other practices that compromise the independence of voter choice.
2. Promote issue-based campaigns and discourage supporters, agents, and political actors from engaging in conduct capable of undermining electoral integrity.

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3. Respect democratic norms and utilise lawful dispute-resolution mechanisms where grievances arise.

To Civil Society Organisations and Development Partners

1. Expand voter education initiatives that address the long-term democratic consequences of vote trading and transactional politics.
2. Strengthen citizen awareness regarding electoral procedures, election technology, and results-management processes to reduce misinformation and improve public confidence.
3. Support independent election observation, electoral reform efforts, and initiatives aimed at improving electoral transparency and accountability.

To Citizens

1. Continue to participate peacefully in democratic processes and hold elected officials accountable beyond election day.
2. Reject inducements and other incentives that compromise the value and independence of the vote.
3. Promote transparency by reporting electoral offences and supporting efforts to strengthen democratic accountability.

KDI remains committed to supporting peaceful, transparent, and credible elections and will continue to engage stakeholders in advancing reforms that strengthen Nigeria's democracy.



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