

The Quest for Peaceful Election

The report and documentation of KDI's 2023 General Election Security Interventions and Assessments.



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Disclaimer:

This document has been produced by Kimpact Development Initiative (KDI) to provide information on her electoral security intervention & programs in all the 2023 General Elections Phases. KDI hereby certifies that all the views expressed in this document accurately reflects the analytical views of the information gathered from the field through the long-term election security monitors (LTM) and desk research, which were verified, reliable and evidence-based. Whilst reasonable care has been taken in preparing this document, KIMPACT, IRI and NED shall take no responsibility for errors or for any views expressed herein for actions taken as a result of information provided in this report.

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About The Election Violence Monitoring And Mitigation (EVMM) Project


During the 2023 Nigeria general elections, KDI initiated a flagship intervention known as Election Violence Monitoring and Mitigation (EVMM) Project . This initiative aimed to provide quantitative electoral violence data for stakeholders and an impartial voice on the nature of electoral violence towards prevention and/or mitigation of election violence. With the support of the National Endowment for Democracy (NED) and the International Republican Institute (IRI), KDI established an Election Security Early Warning System (ES-EWS) in the six geo-political zones assessing the pre-election environment to identify early warning signals – KDI deployed 276 long-term monitors towards gathering week in week out security information. Additionally, KDI, in the last 13 months, has been tracking and documenting issues of electoral violence and the potential for violence across the countries. KDI uses data-driven advocacy and bilateral engagements with election stakeholders, party leaders, socio-cultural leaders, security forces, and other civil society organizations to mitigate electoral violence.

> KIMPACT DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE

Overview of the Project



Six Targeted States and 138 Local Government Areas



Selection Criteria for the States

State DELTA IMO KADUNA OSUN PLATEAU TARABA

- History of election violence
- Latent potential for mass mobilization
- Surging youth demographic interest in the election

INDICATORS ASSESSED ACROSS THE SELECTED IN THE SIX GEOPOLITICAL ZONES

01

Assessment of the pre-election general environment: such as unusual movement, presence of security agencies and tension in the build-up to the election.

02

Nature and Intensity of Voter Education on Electoral Offense.

03

Electoral Malfeasance and interference: abuse of administrative and state resources, Suppression and Vote buying.

04

Early warning signals: Incitement, recruitment of political thugs, militia and gangs, the proliferation of small arms, and growing activities of armed groups.

05

The dominance of political parties and the nature of their campaigning.

06




Electoral Violence: Physical attacks




Our Findings

Predominant Forms of Violence in Each Zones



Violence Tracking (Jan 1st 2022 - Feb 23rd 2023)




Time series analysis of electoral violence incidence



This is not in any way disconnected from the geographical visualization of the time series analysis of electoral violence incidence and trends since 2014- where the southern part of Nigeria is dominated by electoral violence incidence, unlike the northern region.

Number of Election-Related Violence (Jan 1st 2022 - Feb 23rd 2023)



Total: **395**



Total Violence

Category of V

Election Security Early Warning System (ESEWS) 137-316

Gathering structured electoral security data for 17 Weeks across selected states across the six geo-political zones.




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Overall Insight from the Election Security Early Warning System


54% of the total violence recorded in the sample states are physical electoral violence.



107 (78%) of the 138 LGAs witnessed election-related violent attacks.





Electoral Violence Types per States



General Environment

L.G.As that experienced Election Violence In at least 10 out of 17 weeks









KAURU LERE KACHIA SABON GARI ZARIA SABO

General Environment


L.G.As that experienced Election Violence In at least 10 out of 17 weeks








Government Restrictions (37%), such as barring political groups from using public spaces for campaigns –led the list of the overall causative factors of electoral violence in the selected states across the six geo-political zones.



Following Government Restrictions (37%) is civil disobedience/protest (29%). This often results from agitation by party supporters, which often turned violent. Analysis shows that recruitment and arming of thugs (24%) is the overall third causative factors of electoral violence. We cannot but talk about the incitement as one of the causative factors responsible for violence in the 2023 general elections across the selected states in the six geo-political zones.

The ratio of occurrence between these Causative factors of Electoral Violence in Delta State




Electoral violence is concentrated in about ½ of the L.G.As; there is a notable amount of government restrictions, protests and recruitment of thugs in most L.G.As where violence occurred in Delta State. This shows a high correlation with violence.

Trends In DELTA State Per LGAs

Location	Electoral Violence	Protests/civil disobedience	Incitement	Recruiting and Arming Thugs	Governement Restriction: Barring Political groups from Using Public Spaces for Campaigns
IKA SOUTH	17	6	7	11	11
ISOKO SOUTH	17	4	0	1	1
NDOKWA EAS	17	0	0	1	6
OSHIMILI NOF	17	0	1	0	0
BURUTU	16	0	0	0	0
ETHIOPE WEST	16	0	0	0	1
WARRI NORTH	16	11	9	7	14
ANIOCHA SOU	15	4	0	0	0
BOMADI	14	0	0	0	0
ISOKO NORTH	13	13	4	4	5
IKA NORTH EA	11	0	0	9	8
NDOKWA WE	10	0	0	4	10
PATANI	8	17	2	16	17
UGHELLI NOR	7	5	0	4	3
OSHIMILI SOU	5	2	0	0	3
ETHIOPE EAST	4	1	1	1	1
WARRI SOUTH	3	3	0	0	7
UVWIE	2	2	0	1	6
ANIOCHA NOF	1	2	0	1	0
OKPE	1	5	0	1	1
SAPELE	0	0	0	0	4
UDU	0	0	0	0	0
UGHELLI SOU	0	0	0	0	0
UKWUANI	0	0	0	0	1
WARRI SOUTH	0	0	0	1	2

Overall trends in Imo State



Trends In Imo State Per LGAs


Location	Electoral Violence	Protests/civil disobedience	Incitement	Recruiting and Arming Thugs	Barring Political groups from Using Public Spaces for Campaigns
Location	violence	disobedience	incitement	Arming mugs	Campaigns
AHIAZU MBAIS	17	0	16	16	15
IDEATO NORT	17	0	0	0	1
IKEDURU (IHO	17	17	17	17	17
MBAITOLI (NV	17	4	8	11	14
ONUIMO (OKV	17	6	7	11	11
ORSU (AWO ID	17	4	0	1	1
ORU EAST	17	0	0	1	6
OWERRI NORT	17	0	1	0	0
IDEATO SOUTH	16	17	1	2	9
IHITTE/UBOM	16	0	0	0	1
ISIALA MBANG	16	0	4	5	12
NGOR OKPAL	16	2	0	7	2
OBOWO (OTO	16	0	0	0	0
OHAJI/EGBEM	16	0	0	0	1
NKWERRE	15	4	0	0	0
NWANGELE (C	14	0	0	0	0
ORLU	13	13	4	4	5
ABOH MBAISE	12	0	0	1	2
OKIGWE (OKI	11	0	0	9	8
EHIME MBANG	10	0	0	0	0
ORU WEST (M	10	0	0	4	10
OWERRI WEST	5	2	0	0	3
EZINIHITTE ME	4	3	3	5	0
OGUTA (OGUT	4	1	1	1	1
NJABA (NNEN	1	2	0	1	0
OWERRI MUN	1	5	0	1	1
ISU (UMUNDU	0	0	0	3	0

Electoral violence is less spontaneous in Imo State

Electoral violence occurred at high levels in almost ³/₄ of L.G.As; There have been reports of electoral violence happen hand-in-hand with barring opposition from using public spaces for campaigns.

Desk review and advocacy conversation made it known that most of the electoral violence happenings in Imo State happened independently of other variables. Perhaps it was introduced from outside the state through the influx of armed groups. The election was an exacerbating factor. It was increasingly difficult to separate armed conflict and electoral violence in these geo-political zones. This armed conflict overshadowed the incidents of government restrictions on opposing political groups using public spaces for campaigns.

Reviews have shown that conflict and insecurity have become a tool for some elected leaders to make self-serving decisions. Oftentimes, they seize the conflict situation to act unconstitutionally, such as suppressing actions of the opposition parties under the disguise of state or national security. One of them is the situation in Imo State in the last elections, where even opposition parties found it difficult to use state-owned signage.




Overall trends in Kaduna State

Location	Electoral Violence	Protests/civil disobedience	Incitement	Recruiting and Arming Thugs	Governement Restriction: Barring Political groups from Using Public Spaces for Campaigns
KAURU	17	3	3	2.5	3
LERE	17	0	0	0	0
KACHIA	16	11	9	6.5	13.5
SABON GARI	16	1	0	0	17
ZARIA	15	12	0	0	1
SABO	12	11	15	14	9
BIRNIN GWARI	8	17	2	16	17
KUDAN	8	7	0	3	1
IGABI	7	5	0	4	2.5
ZANGON KATA	5	5	0	0	0
KAURA	4	0	0	0	1.5
KADUNA NORT	3	3	0	0	6.5
SANGA	3	17	1	0	3.5
JEMA'A	2	2	0	1	6
KUBAU	1	0	0	0	0
CHIKUN	0	0	0	0	3.5
GIWA	0	0	0	0	0
IKARA	0	0	0	0	0
JABA	0	0	0	0	0.5
KADUNA SOUT	0	0	0	1	1.5
KAGARKO	0	0	0		9
KAJURU	0	8	0	0.5	8
MAKARFI	0	0	0	0	0

Trends In Kaduna State Per LGAs

We have seen physical violence happening hand-in-hand with barring opposition from using public spaces for campaigns and protests.




The Quest For an Ideal Electoral Security System.

Trends In Osun State

Location	Electoral Violence	Protests/civil disobedience	Incitement	Recruiting and Arming Thugs	Governement Restriction: Barring Political groups from
ILESA EAST	17	17	0		0
ODO-OTIN	17	17	10	17	17
OLA-OLUWA	17	0	0	0	0
OROLU	17	1	0		0
IWO	11	0	0		0
ORIADE	10	0	0	-	7
ATAKUMOSA	9	7	0	3	
ILESA WEST	9	0	0	0	0
IFELODUN (OS	8	0	0	0	0
ATAKUMOSA	6	4	6	4	5
IFE NORTH	6	2	3	12	6
AYEDIRE	5	0	2	3	10
EDE SOUTH	3	2	0	14	0
EDE NORTH	2	2	1	2	0
IFE CENTRAL	2	0	0	2	0
IREWOLE	2	0	3	0	0
OSOGBO	2	1	0	0	4
EGBEDORE	1	0	1	4	4
IFE EAST	1	0	0	2	0
ILA	1	U	U		4
BOLUWADUR	0	0	0	0	1
BORIPE	0	4	0	0	0
EJIGBO	0	0	0	0	0
IFE SOUTH	0	11	0	3	5
IFEDAYO	0	0	0	0	0
IREPODUN (O	0	0	0	0	0
ISOKAN	0	0	0	0	0
OBOKUN	0	0	0	0	0

In Osun, there is a moderate correlation between physical violence and Incitement and arming of thugs.




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Trends In Plateau State

Location	Electoral Violence	Protests/civil disobedience	Incitement	Recruiting and Arming Thugs	Restriction: Barring Political groups from Using Public Spaces for Campaigns
JOS NORTH	16	11	0	14	11
JOS SOUTH	16	2	0	0	2.5
SHENDAM	16	1	0	0	0
JOS EAST	10	1	0	0	8
QUA'AN PAN	10	0	0	0	0
PANKSHIN	6	4	0	0	4.5
KANKE	5	11	0	0	17
MANGU	5	0	0	1	0
MIKANG	4	0	1	2	6
BASSA (PLATE	3	0	0	1	0
LANGTANG NO	3	0	0	0	3
WASE	3	0	0	0	0
BARIKIN LADI	1	14	0	0	0
BOKKOS	0	1	0	3.5	7
KANAM	0	0	0	17	0
LANGTANG SC	0	0	0	0	0
RIYOM	0	0	0	0	0

Electoral Violence happenings in Plateau State is happening independently of other variables like recruitment of thugs because there is no high correlation between physical violence and other indicators.

Overall Trends In Taraba State



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
Trends In Taraba State

Location	Electoral Violence	Protests/civil disobedience	Incitement	Recruiting and Arming Thugs	Governement Restriction: Barring Political groups from Using Public Spaces for Campaigns
YORRO	16	0	0	0	0
WUKARI	13	12	14	16	15
DONGA	11	12	12	17	17
JALINGO	10	17	0	12	17
GASSOL	6	9	0	4	8
ARDO-KOLA	5	13	2	2	2
KARIM-LAMID	2	2	0	3	6
LAU	2	14	2	3	9
TAKUM	2	0	0	10	2
BALI	1	17	0	0	17
SARDAUNA	1	0	0	2	0
USSA	1	3	1	2	1
GASHAKA	0	16	1	8	17
IBI	0	0	5	0	0
KURMI	0	0	0	0	2
ZING	0	0	0	6	0

In Taraba, electoral violence is highly correlated with other indicators, such as protests, recruitment of thugs and government restrictions.


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Visibility of Political Party during Campaigns



Visibility of political party =Magnitude of activity x frequency of activity

Highlight	Highlight of Political Parties' Visibility		
State	Most Visible Political Party	Ruling Party In the State	
Delta	PDP	PDP	
Imo	LP	APC	
Kaduna	APC	APC	
Osun	PDP	PDP	
Plateau	PDP	APC	
Taraba	PDP	PDP	




Highlight of Political Parties' Visibility					
State	Most Visible Political Party	Ruling Par- ty In the State	Political Party Allegedly Perpetrating Electoral Violence		
Delta	PDP	PDP	APC/PDP		
Imo	LP	APC	APC		
Kaduna	APC	APC	APC		
Osun	PDP	APC	APC/PDP		
Plateau	PDP	PDP	APC		
Taraba	PDP	PDP	APC/PDP		

There is a correlation between the act of electoral violence perpetrated in the states and the incumbent political party – this can be due to so many reasons.

Desk Review has shown reason could be the following:

- Access to resources financial or administrative structure to
 mobilize the perpetrators
- Systemic malfeasances, such as enforcement agencies looking sideways or covering tracks.

Correlation between the Security Forces Presence and Election Violence



Voter education on Electoral Offences

80%


of the reports show that Campaigns against Vote Buying and Peace Messaging dominated the civic education messages in the sample states



Voter Education messages against vote buying were heard in 136 of the 138 L.G.As on the average of 11 weeks in each of the sample states.



Monitoring reports show that INEC led 62.3% of the civic and voter education effort in the sample states.



Voter Education with the message against vote-buying dominated the electoral landscape. However, as the message went out – it didn't seem to meet its objective because there was no correlation between the vote-buying and the weekly messages against it. V iolence M onitoring M itigation

E lection

Stakeholders Engagement

After the early warning system data, KDI and her partner started data-driven stakeholder engagement.

> INAUGURATION AND CAPACITY BUILDING OF DELTA STATE PEACE AND MONITOR WORKING COMMITTEE

Established the State Peace and Mediation working committee across the six geo-political zones – Delta, Imo, Kaduna, Osun, Plateau and Taraba

The PMWCs, in coordination with KDI and IRI, harmonized and coordinated conflict prevention, management, and resolution towards sustainable peace before, during and after the elections. They facilitated amicable conflict resolution through mediation and other processes, including indigenous mechanisms for conflict resolution and peacebuilding.



Technical Session with the Security Agencies shared the Pre-Election Security Risk Assessment and monitoring reports of election violence mapping and recommendations with the agencies so they can have data that will inform their deployment, mitigation strategies, and intervention areas.



This media programming was to maintain the consistency of the peace message and sustain the dialogue for a peaceful election on the front burner of public discussion and in the consciousness of citizens. Conducted Citizen-Stakeholder Radio Town Hall Meetings across the six geo-political zones – Delta, Imo, Kaduna, Osun, Plateau and Taraba



KDI, with PMWC paid advocacy visits to key stakeholders across the six states. The advocacy was to build relationships and partnerships and initiate dialogue on how to mitigate electoral violence and deploy immediate responses to violent-prone areas before, during, and after the election.



Election Data Dashboard KDI/AIT KDI secured a partnership with African Independent Television (AIT) to sustain dialogue on the need for peaceful elections and pressure election stakeholders to fulfil their commitment to non-violent elections. This partnership seeks to achieve this objective through three (3) major media engagements. These activities include:

- Two (2) Studio-based National Television Dialogue (Virtual TownHall Meeting)
- Election Data Dashboard on AIT Democracy Today
- KDI/AIT Election Day Situation Room for joint analysis.
- Production and airing of video peace messaging.



KDI hosted National Dialogue on curbing electoral violence with key electoral actors to discuss ways of ensuring a peaceful elections.

Trend analysis from pre-election to election day



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Cumulative Total of 2023 General Election Day Violence



Presidential/NASS Elections – February 25th, 2023 & Governorship/SHoA Elections – March 18th, 2023

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Election Day Violence Disaggregation:




Presidential/NASS Elections – February 25th, 2023



Election Day Violence Disaggregation: Governorship/ SHoA Elections – March 18th, 2023


Electoral Violence Incidence Tracked 25th Feb, 2023



Electoral Violence Incidence Tracked 18th March, 2023



Comparative Analysis of Election Day Violence and Projected Areas of Violence




Projected Areas at risk of Electoral Violence



Election Day Real Time Violence Data Capture

Total Number of Death Recorded for the 2023 Election Days



Recommendations

- 1. We recommend that the security agencies need to ensure that their deployment during elections are predicate on viable early warning systems, this as proven to be one of the potent ways to mitigate electoral violence based on the findings that shows that the higher the presence of security forces in a community the lower the number of electoral violence recorded.
- 2. The government must give zero tolerance to illegal proliferation of arms before, during and after the elections as recruitment of thugs and arming of thugs played huge contributing role in electoral violence recorded in the sample states.
- 3. The CSOs and the media need to pay close attention and hugely condemn the subtle abuse of power by incumbent government who places restriction on political groups from using public venues for their campaigns. It is increasingly becoming a major causative factor of electoral violence.
- 4. INEC, the Police and Federal Ministry of Justice to ensure the prosecution of electoral offenders as this will serve as deterrence to other electoral offenders. This also underscore the urgent need for the Electoral Offenses Commission.

- 5. The Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) need to rise up to the occasion to prosecute offenders involved in vote buying and selling as this will serve as deterrent for others.
- 6. It is important that CSOs continue to educate the citizen and support the election security management with data and early warning signals that could help the security agencies





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