/ KDI's Post Election Statement on the 2024 Edo State Off-Cycle Governorship Election
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KDI's Post Election Statement on the 2024 Edo State Off-Cycle Governorship Election
Sep 26, 2024
This statement is a follow up on the preliminary statement issued at 1.30 pm on Saturday, September 21st, 2024
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE
Wednesday September 25, 2024
Kimpact Development Initiative,
Election Day Data Room.
Addressing Electoral Challenges: Assessing Electoral Security Accountability and Ballot Integrity in the 2024 Edo Governorship Election.
Kimpact Development Initiative (KDI), is pleased to present its post-election assessment of the Edo State off-cycle governorship elections held on September 21, 2024. As part of our mandate to support the integrity and security of electoral processes, we focused on four core areas during this election: election violence monitoring and mitigation, ballot integrity, campaign finance oversight, and the utilization of artificial intelligence to enhance democratic knowledge.
On September 20, 2024, KDI activated its Election Day Data Room (EDDR), which functioned as the central hub for gathering, analyzing, and reporting real-time information from the field. The EDDR ensured that data from our deployed observers was carefully reviewed, verified, and processed to offer immediate insights to election management bodies (EMBs) and stakeholders, facilitating prompt responses to emerging issues. On Election Day- 21st September, KDI deployed 431 trained observers across Edo’s 18 LGAs and 192 wards. These observers provided live updates on electoral incidents, the conduct of election officials, ballot integrity, and security-related issues. Their reports provide a comprehensive picture of the election environment.
KDI in its preliminary statement on the election day identified several key issues impacting the electoral process. One of the most significant challenges was the late arrival of election materials, particularly in rural areas, which led to delays in the commencement of voting. These logistical setbacks were compounded by adverse weather conditions, such as rainfall in parts of Esan West, Esan Southeast, and Owan West, which disrupted the transportation of materials and affected voter turnout in some areas.
KDI also raised concerns about the widespread occurrence of vote buying. This was observed across all three senatorial districts, with inducements ranging from ₦1,000 to ₦10,000 in cash and material incentives, undermining the credibility of the election. This post-election statement seeks to further update the public and key stakeholders on KDI’s key findings and observations regarding the election day processes.
KEY OBSERVATIONS/FINDINGS:
Firstly, the 2024 Edo governorship election showcased a wide range of electoral experiences, with some aspects being commendable, others raising concerns, and a few being outright alarming.
Vote Trading - A Persistent Challenge: Despite our earlier warning about the ongoing issue of vote trading, KDI has observed that little was done to curb or abate this widespread electoral malpractice which is now pervasive in Nigeria’s electoral space. Politicians continue to refine their approaches to votebuying, with vote trading transpiring both plainly and discreetly during the 2024 Edo State Governorship election day across all local government areas of the state. In Ward 7, PU 9 -Aiyegunle, by Chief Aliu’s Compund (Akoko Edo LGA), money was exchanged openly, with reports of a political party distributing N10,000 to voters without restraint. In Ward 12 (Orhionmwon LGA), vote trading was blatant, with APC and PDP engaging in this practice—buying votes with a minimum fee of ₦5,000 and as high as ₦10,000. In Ward 7, PU 16 (Esan West LGA), political parties were said to have paid up to ₦12,000 to voters.
KDI’s EDDR recorded isolated actions taken by security agents to deter vote trading. For instance, officers of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) arrested a vote buyer in Ward 5, PU 37 (Oredo LGA), and some political party supporters were apprehended in Ikpoba Okha LGA for engaging in vote buying. In Iguobazuwa East, PU 11 (Ovia South West LGA), security personnel were called in to resolve a dispute over allegations that a political party supporters was distributing ₦5,000 per vote.
More egregious cases of vote trading were documented in Ward 1, PU 9 (Ovia South West LGA), where vote buying occurred, and in Ward 6, PU 6 (Ovia North East LGA), which saw a well organized vote trading. Blatant instances were recorded in Ward 5, PU 18 & 19, as well as Ward 6, PU 14 of Ovia Southwest. Ikpoba Okha LGA saw widespread vote trading, with party agents offering refreshments and distributing materials such as pasta to sway voters. Several other incidents of vote trading were recorded across Uhunmwonde, where voters were paid as little as ₦1,000 in some polling units, indicating the pervasive nature of this problem. These developments underscore the ongoing challenge of vote trading in Nigerian elections, threatening the integrity of the electoral process.
Issues around Permanent Voter Cards (PVC): There were pockets of reports where some individuals presented PVCs which was not theirs, raising concerns about the security of electoral materials as sensitive as PVCs. For instance, in Ward 3, PU 18 of Akoko Edo LGA, an individual attempted to vote with another person’s PVC. This was quickly noticed by other voters who identified that the individual was not registered at the polling unit. The situation almost escalated into a disruption of the voting process, but security agents intervened and resolved the issue. Similarly, in Ward 4, PU 8 of Orhionmwon LGA, voters reported that unfamiliar faces with voter cards were being allowed to vote by INEC officials. These voters were suspected of bearing fake voter cards, as they were permitted to vote without undergoing the required BVAS biometric verification. These instances highlight the need for stricter adherence to voter identification procedures to maintain the credibility of the election process. While these represent isolated instances, they raise significant concerns, particularly given the Nigeria Police Force's assertion that only six individuals were arrested on election day, alongside the troubling discovery of multiple PVCs in the possession of these persons. This indicates that it must be addressed without delay before it evolves into a prevalent political tactic to undermine the will of the people.
KDI also documented multiple cases of voter intimidation and harassment. In Ward 11, PUs 5 and 6 of Etsako West LGA, political party agents were reported to have pressured voters into casting ballots in their favor, while a political actors in Ward 11, PU 34 of Oredo LGA threatened voters to support his preferred party, nearly derailing the voting process before being apprehended by security agents. Furthermore, in Ward 1, PU 2 of Egor LGA, security agents were reportedly complicit in intimidating election observers alongside political party agents. Other reports highlighted disruptions by party agents attempting to influence voters, leading to confrontations, such as the scuffle between PDP and APC agents in Ward 4, PU 3 of Akoko Edo. These incidents underscore the urgent need for stricter enforcement of electoral laws and the pivotal role of security agents in safeguarding the integrity of the voting process.
KDI’S POSITION ON THE BALLOT INTEGRITY On Sunday, September 22, 2024, KDI completed an analysis of the data uploaded to the IReV, using the Ballot Integrity Project (BIP) methodology. With a margin of error of ±2%, our findings raise critical concerns regarding the integrity of the result management process in the election.
Firstly, KDI has consistently noted with concern the long-standing issues in Nigeria's result collation process, which remains susceptible to human error and system failures. We are deeply concerned about the usual rituals at the collation centers, where stakeholders’ frequently raised concerns, are often met with the standard response: "Point noted". No administrative steps are taken to assess the merit or demerit of these concerns. This has been an observable trend from previous elections and the election in Edo State, despite Section 65 of the Electoral Act empowering INEC to review election results within seven days of their announcement. Additionally, INEC’s own 2022 Guidelines and Regulations for the Conduct of Elections (Section 99) expounds this administrative power.
Our BIP analysis shows a 6.04% inflation in the results declared by INEC. Ideally, results should either decrease during the collation process—due to cancellations prompted by issues like violence or BVAS bypasses—or remain consistent if no such cancellations occurred. However, we noticed an increase or addition in the number of votes in some collation centers. This discrepancy casts serious doubt on the transparency and credibility of the collation process.
Moreover, while all 18 LGA Returning Officers and Electoral Officers (EOs) reported no cancellations during the state-level collation, our analysis shows that at least 22 polling units had Form EC40G uploaded on IReV, indicating disruptions or BVAS-related issues. The Permanent Voter Cards (PVCs) collected in these polling units exceed the margin of lead based on the IReV-collated results, raising concerns about the accuracy of the declared outcome. This indicates a high likelihood of a supplementary election in the 2024 Edo state governorship elections if PU results on IREV were consistent with what was declared
Additionally, INEC stated that 604,132 voters were accredited, yielding 570,690 valid votes and 13,275 rejected ballots, resulting in a total of 583,965 votes cast. This leads to a discrepancy of 20,167 accredited voters whose votes were omitted from both the valid and rejected vote classifications. If no votes were cancelled, as reported by INEC returning officials from LGAs, this raises a pertinent question: Where are the 20,167 missing votes?
Finally, regarding result management, we urge INEC to thoroughly examine the quality of training provided to the adhoc staff and to investigate any potential instances of sabotage within the process. An examination of Form EC8A on IREV reveals distinct instances of overvoting in more than 300 polling units across 14 local government areas. There are instances in which the number of voters exceeded the total number of accredited voters. We urge INEC to investigate whether these discrepancies were intentional or merely arithmetic errors made by the polling officials.
CONCLUSION Using predictive modeling, KDI projected voter turnout to range between 20% and 24%, with a lower margin of lead in comparison to the 2020 gubernatorial election and considering the current electoral climate. The actual turnout of 22.4% aligns with our forecast, as does the reduced margin of lead, which fell to 44,393 from the 84,336 recorded in the 2020 gubernatorial election.
In addition, we had advised INEC and security agencies to prepare for adverse weather conditions, as rain was forecasted to potentially affect voter turnout and increase the number of rejected votes. Our prediction proved accurate, with the rain impacting turnout in some areas and contributing to a rise in rejected votes compared to 2020.
While KDI does not intend to be alarmist, we strongly advocate that election stakeholders pay closer attention to data-driven insights. Reliable data, facts, and figures are crucial for effective planning and can help avert preventable issues if adequately considered and acted upon.
CALL TO ACTION / RECOMMENDATIONS
KDI remains committed to working with stakeholders to improve the integrity of Nigeria’s electoral process. We will continue monitoring post-election developments and engage in dialogues aimed at reforming and strengthening democratic systems.
Thank you for your attention.
Signed
Kimpact Development Initiative
KIMPACT
DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE
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