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KDI's Post Election Statement on the 2024 Edo State Off-Cycle Governorship Election

Sep 26, 2024


Kimpact Development Initiative’s (KDI’s) Post Election Statement on the 2024 Edo State Off-Cycle Governorship Election.

This statement is a follow up on the preliminary statement issued at 1.30 pm on Saturday, September 21st, 2024

FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

Wednesday September 25, 2024
Kimpact Development Initiative,
Election Day Data Room.

Addressing Electoral Challenges: Assessing Electoral Security Accountability and Ballot Integrity in the 2024 Edo Governorship Election.

Kimpact Development Initiative (KDI), is pleased to present its post-election assessment of the Edo State off-cycle governorship elections held on September 21, 2024. As part of our mandate to support the integrity and security of electoral processes, we focused on four core areas during this election: election violence monitoring and mitigation, ballot integrity, campaign finance oversight, and the utilization of artificial intelligence to enhance democratic knowledge.

On September 20, 2024, KDI activated its Election Day Data Room (EDDR), which functioned as the central hub for gathering, analyzing, and reporting real-time information from the field. The EDDR ensured that data from our deployed observers was carefully reviewed, verified, and processed to offer immediate insights to election management bodies (EMBs) and stakeholders, facilitating prompt responses to emerging issues. On Election Day- 21st September, KDI deployed 431 trained observers across Edo’s 18 LGAs and 192 wards. These observers provided live updates on electoral incidents, the conduct of election officials, ballot integrity, and security-related issues. Their reports provide a comprehensive picture of the election environment.

KDI in its preliminary statement on the election day identified several key issues impacting the electoral process. One of the most significant challenges was the late arrival of election materials, particularly in rural areas, which led to delays in the commencement of voting. These logistical setbacks were compounded by adverse weather conditions, such as rainfall in parts of Esan West, Esan Southeast, and Owan West, which disrupted the transportation of materials and affected voter turnout in some areas.

KDI also raised concerns about the widespread occurrence of vote buying. This was observed across all three senatorial districts, with inducements ranging from ₦1,000 to ₦10,000 in cash and material incentives, undermining the credibility of the election. This post-election statement seeks to further update the public and key stakeholders on KDI’s key findings and observations regarding the election day processes.

KEY OBSERVATIONS/FINDINGS:

Firstly, the 2024 Edo governorship election showcased a wide range of electoral experiences, with some aspects being commendable, others raising concerns, and a few being outright alarming.

  • On the positive side, we commend the relative peace that charaterized the election day, despite the palpable tension that marked the pre-election phase. We believe this was allowed by the Edo citizens and reinforced by the relative adequacy in policing structure and professionalism of security personnel to allow movement of essential workers in most of the LGAs. There were few reports of shortage of security personnel in certain polling units – such as Ward 4: PU 9 but the security agencies upon getting this information sent reinforcements at 11:00 am. Even though there were few acts of violence and disruption of polls in Esan Central, Ovia Southwest and collation centers in Oredo, Egor, and Ikpoba-Okha LGAs. It is noteworthy to state that there were no fatalities recorded in this election.
  • There were noticeable improvements in the functionality of BVAS in the election – even though the KDI Election Day Data Room report shows a few cases of BVAS malfunctioning on election day. Report showed that most of these malfunctioned BVAS were due to technical issues; we also got a meagre report of ad-hoc officers not having password details as of when they got to their PUs and about to commence the process.
  • We commend the functionality of IReV and the swiftness of PU results upload on to the platform – KDI EDDR noted that as of 19:22 WAT, 92% of the expected PU results had been uploaded on IReV. This is an improvement compared to other elections.
    There were issues that signals a Potential for Violence which raised concerns as to the preparedness of INEC. Some of these include:
  • Late commencement of polls resulting from planning and logistical challenges: The issue of logistics is one of the perennial challenges that has plagued the electoral process in Nigeria and the 2024 Edo governorship elections was no different. The Edo election was hindered by insufficient preparations for the in-season rains and inadequate transport preparations, resulting in delayed departures of INEC ad-hoc workers from some Registration Area Centres (RACs) to polling units. This automatically led to late arrival of election materials in some places. KDI in page 41 of her pre-Election Security Risk Assessment (ESRA) using Accuweather predicted that Edo state will be mainly cloudy with showers and a 40% probability of precipitation, with 2 hours of rain. This information was publicized and communicated to INEC through different media and the quarterly consultative forums. Yet, it appears no adequate preparation was made for this by INEC in its contingency planning, leading to halting of the voting process in some areas (Esan NorthEast, Esan Central, Estako Central and Igueben), Certain PUs were unable to continue accreditation in (IkpobaOkha, Egor, Uhunmwonde, Oredo, Ovia Northeast) whilst others voted under the rain in Uhunmwode and Esan Central. We believe that INEC needs to conduct a ballot paper audit to ascertain if rain on the election day affected the ballot papers in areas where it was raining and voting was going on at the same time – this is needed considering the high number (13,275) of rejected votes which is a 3.43% increase from the rejected votes (12,835) of the 2020 governorship elections in the state. We believe this lesson will help to prevent such in future elections.
  • Vote Trading - A Persistent Challenge: Despite our earlier warning about the ongoing issue of vote trading, KDI has observed that little was done to curb or abate this widespread electoral malpractice which is now pervasive in Nigeria’s electoral space. Politicians continue to refine their approaches to votebuying, with vote trading transpiring both plainly and discreetly during the 2024 Edo State Governorship election day across all local government areas of the state. In Ward 7, PU 9 -Aiyegunle, by Chief Aliu’s Compund (Akoko Edo LGA), money was exchanged openly, with reports of a political party distributing N10,000 to voters without restraint. In Ward 12 (Orhionmwon LGA), vote trading was blatant, with APC and PDP engaging in this practice—buying votes with a minimum fee of ₦5,000 and as high as ₦10,000. In Ward 7, PU 16 (Esan West LGA), political parties were said to have paid up to ₦12,000 to voters.

    KDI’s EDDR recorded isolated actions taken by security agents to deter vote trading. For instance, officers of the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) arrested a vote buyer in Ward 5, PU 37 (Oredo LGA), and some political party supporters were apprehended in Ikpoba Okha LGA for engaging in vote buying. In Iguobazuwa East, PU 11 (Ovia South West LGA), security personnel were called in to resolve a dispute over allegations that a political party supporters was distributing ₦5,000 per vote.

    More egregious cases of vote trading were documented in Ward 1, PU 9 (Ovia South West LGA), where vote buying occurred, and in Ward 6, PU 6 (Ovia North East LGA), which saw a well organized vote trading. Blatant instances were recorded in Ward 5, PU 18 & 19, as well as Ward 6, PU 14 of Ovia Southwest. Ikpoba Okha LGA saw widespread vote trading, with party agents offering refreshments and distributing materials such as pasta to sway voters. Several other incidents of vote trading were recorded across Uhunmwonde, where voters were paid as little as ₦1,000 in some polling units, indicating the pervasive nature of this problem. These developments underscore the ongoing challenge of vote trading in Nigerian elections, threatening the integrity of the electoral process.

  • Issues around Permanent Voter Cards (PVC): There were pockets of reports where some individuals presented PVCs which was not theirs, raising concerns about the security of electoral materials as sensitive as PVCs. For instance, in Ward 3, PU 18 of Akoko Edo LGA, an individual attempted to vote with another person’s PVC. This was quickly noticed by other voters who identified that the individual was not registered at the polling unit. The situation almost escalated into a disruption of the voting process, but security agents intervened and resolved the issue. Similarly, in Ward 4, PU 8 of Orhionmwon LGA, voters reported that unfamiliar faces with voter cards were being allowed to vote by INEC officials. These voters were suspected of bearing fake voter cards, as they were permitted to vote without undergoing the required BVAS biometric verification. These instances highlight the need for stricter adherence to voter identification procedures to maintain the credibility of the election process. While these represent isolated instances, they raise significant concerns, particularly given the Nigeria Police Force's assertion that only six individuals were arrested on election day, alongside the troubling discovery of multiple PVCs in the possession of these persons. This indicates that it must be addressed without delay before it evolves into a prevalent political tactic to undermine the will of the people.

    KDI also documented multiple cases of voter intimidation and harassment. In Ward 11, PUs 5 and 6 of Etsako West LGA, political party agents were reported to have pressured voters into casting ballots in their favor, while a political actors in Ward 11, PU 34 of Oredo LGA threatened voters to support his preferred party, nearly derailing the voting process before being apprehended by security agents. Furthermore, in Ward 1, PU 2 of Egor LGA, security agents were reportedly complicit in intimidating election observers alongside political party agents. Other reports highlighted disruptions by party agents attempting to influence voters, leading to confrontations, such as the scuffle between PDP and APC agents in Ward 4, PU 3 of Akoko Edo. These incidents underscore the urgent need for stricter enforcement of electoral laws and the pivotal role of security agents in safeguarding the integrity of the voting process.

KDI’S POSITION ON THE BALLOT INTEGRITY On Sunday, September 22, 2024, KDI completed an analysis of the data uploaded to the IReV, using the Ballot Integrity Project (BIP) methodology. With a margin of error of ±2%, our findings raise critical concerns regarding the integrity of the result management process in the election.

Firstly, KDI has consistently noted with concern the long-standing issues in Nigeria's result collation process, which remains susceptible to human error and system failures. We are deeply concerned about the usual rituals at the collation centers, where stakeholders’ frequently raised concerns, are often met with the standard response: "Point noted". No administrative steps are taken to assess the merit or demerit of these concerns. This has been an observable trend from previous elections and the election in Edo State, despite Section 65 of the Electoral Act empowering INEC to review election results within seven days of their announcement. Additionally, INEC’s own 2022 Guidelines and Regulations for the Conduct of Elections (Section 99) expounds this administrative power.

Our BIP analysis shows a 6.04% inflation in the results declared by INEC. Ideally, results should either decrease during the collation process—due to cancellations prompted by issues like violence or BVAS bypasses—or remain consistent if no such cancellations occurred. However, we noticed an increase or addition in the number of votes in some collation centers. This discrepancy casts serious doubt on the transparency and credibility of the collation process.

Moreover, while all 18 LGA Returning Officers and Electoral Officers (EOs) reported no cancellations during the state-level collation, our analysis shows that at least 22 polling units had Form EC40G uploaded on IReV, indicating disruptions or BVAS-related issues. The Permanent Voter Cards (PVCs) collected in these polling units exceed the margin of lead based on the IReV-collated results, raising concerns about the accuracy of the declared outcome. This indicates a high likelihood of a supplementary election in the 2024 Edo state governorship elections if PU results on IREV were consistent with what was declared

Additionally, INEC stated that 604,132 voters were accredited, yielding 570,690 valid votes and 13,275 rejected ballots, resulting in a total of 583,965 votes cast. This leads to a discrepancy of 20,167 accredited voters whose votes were omitted from both the valid and rejected vote classifications. If no votes were cancelled, as reported by INEC returning officials from LGAs, this raises a pertinent question: Where are the 20,167 missing votes?

Finally, regarding result management, we urge INEC to thoroughly examine the quality of training provided to the adhoc staff and to investigate any potential instances of sabotage within the process. An examination of Form EC8A on IREV reveals distinct instances of overvoting in more than 300 polling units across 14 local government areas. There are instances in which the number of voters exceeded the total number of accredited voters. We urge INEC to investigate whether these discrepancies were intentional or merely arithmetic errors made by the polling officials.

CONCLUSION Using predictive modeling, KDI projected voter turnout to range between 20% and 24%, with a lower margin of lead in comparison to the 2020 gubernatorial election and considering the current electoral climate. The actual turnout of 22.4% aligns with our forecast, as does the reduced margin of lead, which fell to 44,393 from the 84,336 recorded in the 2020 gubernatorial election.

In addition, we had advised INEC and security agencies to prepare for adverse weather conditions, as rain was forecasted to potentially affect voter turnout and increase the number of rejected votes. Our prediction proved accurate, with the rain impacting turnout in some areas and contributing to a rise in rejected votes compared to 2020.

While KDI does not intend to be alarmist, we strongly advocate that election stakeholders pay closer attention to data-driven insights. Reliable data, facts, and figures are crucial for effective planning and can help avert preventable issues if adequately considered and acted upon.

CALL TO ACTION / RECOMMENDATIONS

  • To ensure the ballot security, it is essential to conduct a thorough audit of the ballot papers, particularly in areas impacted by adverse weather conditions. This audit will determine whether environmental factors, such as rain, contributed to the increased number of rejected votes. If issues are discovered, mitigation measures must be identified to safeguard future elections against similar risks.
  • INEC must strengthen its contingency planning to account for logistical disruptions, including weather-related challenges, which have the potential to delay election processes. INEC should also develop comprehensive protocols to address unforeseen circumstances (force majeure), such as the heavy rain during the election. This will ensure that voting continues smoothly and election timelines are adhered to, despite external factors.
  • To reduce human error and increase efficiency, INEC should prioritize the adoption of automated systems for result collation and management. This will enhance accuracy, minimize delays, and improve the transparency of the election results. Automated systems should be robust, easy to audit, and designed to mitigate potential cybersecurity threats.
  • The impunity with which vote buying and selling took place during the election is alarming and poses a significant threat to the integrity of Nigeria’s democracy. Electoral stakeholders must intensify efforts to combat vote trading by closely collaborating with security agencies, civil society organizations, and election observers. Strict enforcement of electoral laws, especially those concerning vote trading, should be a priority, with a focus on prosecuting offenders to send a strong message that electoral malpractice will not be tolerated.
  • The media plays a crucial role in safeguarding electoral integrity. Investigative reporting on election day should be encouraged to document instances of vote buying and other illegal activities. Such documentation will serve as credible evidence in prosecuting offenders under Section 121 of the Electoral Act 2022, helping to deter future electoral malpractices.
  • The timely prosecution of individuals involved in electoral offenses is critical to maintaining the credibility of future elections. In the recently concluded Edo State election, incidents of ballot box snatching, vote buying, and thuggery were reported. While the Nigeria Police Force has arrested six individuals linked to these offenses, it is essential that they face prompt and fair prosecution. Failure to hold these offenders accountable will only embolden others to engage in similar acts of electoral violence and fraud.
  • Strengthening the verification process of Permanent Voter Cards (PVCs) is necessary to maintain the credibility of the election process. Ensuring that only registered and legitimate voters participate in elections will reduce the chances of electoral fraud and increase voter confidence in the system.
  • Political actors and candidates have a responsibility to promote peaceful elections by ensuring that their supporters do not engage in violence. It is vital for political leaders to actively discourage their followers from being used as tools for disrupting the electoral process. Political actors should lead by example, advocating for peace and stability, which are essential for the development of the state.
  • As critical stakeholders in the electoral process, voters must prioritize peace and avoid being complicit in acts of violence. Development and progress can only be achieved in a peaceful environment. Voters in Edo State should recognize that engaging in violence not only jeopardizes the security of their communities but also undermines the democratic process. Peace should be seen as a shared responsibility, and all citizens are urged to contribute to a peaceful and orderly election environment.

KDI remains committed to working with stakeholders to improve the integrity of Nigeria’s electoral process. We will continue monitoring post-election developments and engage in dialogues aimed at reforming and strengthening democratic systems.

Thank you for your attention.

Signed
Kimpact Development Initiative

KIMPACT

DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE