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Kimpact Development Initiative’s (KDI’s) Post Election Statement on the 2024 Ondo State Off-Cycle Governorship Election

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Kimpact Development Initiative’s (KDI’s) Post Election Statement on the 2024 Ondo State Off-Cycle Governorship Election

Dec 10, 2024


For Immediate Release.
Tuesday, December 10, 2024


KDI’S FINAL STATEMENT ON THE CONDUCT OF THE 2024 ONDO STATE GOVERNORSHIP ELECTION.

Distinguished Members of the Press, Ladies and Gentlemen, Kimpact Development Initiative (KDI) is pleased to present its comprehensive assessment of the 2024 Ondo State off-cycle governorship elections held on November 16, 2024. As part of our mandate to support the integrity and security of the electoral processes, we focused on four core areas during this election:

  • Election Violence Monitoring and Mitigation: This tracks and mitigates electoral violence through an Election Security Early Warning System (ESEWS) using globally acceptable risk indicators and real-time data from our long-term security monitors.
  • Ballot Integrity Project (BIP): An effort that independently verifies the accuracy of election results using statistical and scientific methods to enhance the credibility of electoral outcomes.
  • Campaign Finance Oversight: An intervention that ensures transparency in campaign finance by tracking and documenting political parties' and candidates’ expenditures to promote compliance with campaign finance laws.
  • NaijaElections: Utilisation of artificial intelligence to enhance democratic knowledge. NaijaElections is an AI-powered guide to Nigeria's electoral laws, guidelines, and procedures, offering citizens precise, context-specific electoral knowledge.

To ensure comprehensive monitoring of the electoral process, KDI established a dedicated Election Data Room (EDR), which opened on November 14, 2024. The EDR's objectives include:

  1. Documenting incidents of electoral violence in real-time.
  2. Assessing the overall integrity and security of the election process.
  3. Providing timely insights to election stakeholders for prompt action.

The EDR analyses real-time reports from 3,362 trained observers deployed across the 203 wards of Ondo State. These observers provided live updates on electoral incidents, the conduct of election officials, ballot integrity, and security-related issues. Their reports provide a comprehensive picture of the election environment. Also, it is noteworthy to note that KDI over the past nine months has actively monitored and analysed the pre-election environment, deploying 45 long-term monitors to identify and document early warning signs of potential electoral violence. This effort has established an Election Security Early Warning System (ESEWS) across all 18 local government areas (LGAs) in Ondo State, utilising globally accepted indicators tested in over 11 countries through the IFES/EVER methodology.

KDI in its preliminary statement on the election day observed that the Ondo State governorship election was relatively peaceful in its early hours, with a notable adequacy in policing structures and professionalism. Security personnel played a critical role in ensuring order, enforcing movement restrictions, and maintaining a visible presence.

The early arrival of election materials and timely deployment of polling officials reflected a high level of preparedness by INEC. KDI observers reported that election officials arrived at most polling stations before 8:00 am in most cases, with voting commencing shortly thereafter. BVAS generally performed well, although isolated malfunctions, particularly with capturing the biometrics of elderly voters, were noted. Nevertheless, the trajectory of KDI’s overall assessment of the election did not deviate from the preliminary observations. While the election day logistics were efficient and over 90% of PUs commenced the voting and accreditation process on time, there were widespread incidents of vote-buying. The phenomenon of vote buying remains entrenched, with transactions observed across all senatorial districts involving amounts ranging from ₦5,000 to over ₦10,000. Interference by the party agents somewhat led to sporadic violence in some locations because they were notable challenges, raising questions about the robustness of Nigeria’s electoral integrity.

The credibility of the 2024 Ondo election was further shaped by how it was evaluated, and many reactions have evaluated the Ondo 2024 election in comparison with previous elections in Nigeria, including the 2023 general elections, the Imo, Bayelsa, and Kogi 2023 off-cycle governorship elections, and the Edo 2024 off-cycle governorship election. While such comparisons may suggest improvement, this raises a critical question with the understanding that the Ondo 2024 election took place on the backdrop of lingering electoral challenges that were highlighted by CSOs in the 2024 Edo state governorship election, particularly issues of result management, logistics inefficiencies, and the integrity of the electoral process. The question is:

Are these elections the standard of credible democracy? Or is Nigeria merely lowering the bar for electoral excellence?

KDI believes that evaluating elections solely through the lens of comparative improvement solely within the Nigerian context risks normalising ordinariness and diverging from global best practices.

Based on the foregoing, KDI finds it thoughtful to benchmark the findings of its election observation of the conduct of the elections against international best practices for elections. KDI adopted a blended approach, benchmarking the findings from the 2024 Ondo Governorship Election against international norms while considering local socio-political realities. The international best practices benchmarked in this study include:

  • Voting and Election Rights: Equal and Secret Suffrage, Non-Discrimination, Voter Accessibility, Candidature, Party, and Campaign Rights and Responsibilities.
  • Transparency and Accountability: Transparency of Processes and Access to Results.
  • Independent Election Management: No Interference from the State.
  • Ethical Conduct of Stakeholders: Behaviour of Electoral Administrators and Conduct of Political Parties and Candidates.
  • Effective Election Administration: Electoral Roll and Voter Registration are error-free and inclusive.
  • Efficient Election Day Operations: Election Security Management and Logistics.
  • Electoral Results Management: Inclusive and Accurate Counting.
  • Respect for Electoral Outcomes: Acceptance of Electoral Outcomes.
  • Oversight and Enforcement: Access to monitor and observe the elections.

These benchmarks aim to provide a practical evaluation of Ondo’s election conduct, emphasising areas of progress, identifying gaps, and offering actionable recommendations.


KEY ASSESSMENTS

  1. Equal and Secret Suffrage, Non-Discrimination, and Voter Accessibility: The 2024 Ondo State governorship election saw commendable efforts to ensure equal and secret suffrage, with no reported cases of voter discrimination or undue barriers to participation. However, some very important issues emerged, notably in several locations in Akure North, Akoko South, Ifedore, Okitipupa, and Akoko Southwest, where voters without Permanent Voter Cards (PVCs) were allowed to vote after identification on the voter register pasted at the PU. This was more apparent in Akure North Ward 5 PU 18, and it raises concerns about the relevance of PVCs and the enforcement of guidelines and raises questions about the consistency of enforcing the "No PVC, No Voting" rule.

    The Bimodal Voter Accreditation System (BVAS) generally functioned well but encountered isolated malfunctions, particularly in capturing the biometrics of elderly voters in areas such as Akoko Southeast Ward 8 PU 6 and Ward 6 PUs 1 and 2, Akure North Ward 10 PU 3, Okitipupa Ward 2 PU 9, Ilu-Titun 1 PU 11, and multiple locations in Ilaje, Ose, and Idanre. This shows that some demographics may be excluded, and that accreditation technology should be more inclusive. While some ICT specialists raised concerns that BVAS face recognition may theoretically be immune to age-related changes, these practical faults expose infrastructural gaps. Additionally, KDI observed that the secrecy of the ballot was compromised in some locations, including Odigbo and Akoko South-East LGAs, where party agents reportedly instructed some voters on how and where to vote.

  2. Transparency and Fairness of Processes: The Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC) demonstrated logistical efficiency and transparent communication of procedures, contributing to a well-organised election. The timely release of results on the INEC Results Viewing Portal (IReV) and efforts to maintain logistical transparency were commendable.

    In Ondo State, as observed during the 2024 governorship election, vote buying manifested in multifaceted ways, challenging the election’s adherence to principles of transparency and fairness. Despite procedural safeguards designed to ensure ballot secrecy in Nigeria, vote-buyers employed various tactics—ranging from moral debt to intimidation—to compromise the secrecy of the ballot and ensure and guarantee that purchased votes are cast for the intended candidates. KDI’s Election Day Data Room received multiple reports of vote buying across all three senatorial districts in the Ondo State governorship election. So far, votes are traded for between N1,000 and N10,000 in several polling units in Akoko Northwest, Akoko Southwest, Akure North, Akure South, Ese Odo, Idanre, Ifedore, Ilaje, Ile Oluji/Okeigbo, Irele, Odigbo, Okitipupa, Ondo West and Owo. This got worse in PU 23 around Oniparaga Area in Odigbo LGA – where rubber pale was distributed openly as a means of exchange for votes. More egregious cases of vote trading were documented in Ward 8, PU 19 (Owo LGA) and Ward 7 PU 12 (Akure North LGA), where votes were bought for over ₦10,000 blatantly.

  3. Non-Interference by the State: No evidence suggested direct interference by the state during the election, and INEC's operations were conducted independently. However, pre-election protests calling for the removal of the Resident Electoral Commissioner (REC) over alleged bias towards a candidate highlighted public concerns about potential partisanship within the Election Management Body (EMB). Such allegation, though not proven continues to deepen the negative perception against INEC. Knowing fully well that there have been public outcries against the appointment of some of the leadership team of INEC recently.

  4. The Behaviour of Electoral Administrators: Most polling officials demonstrated professionalism and timeliness in their duties. However, there were a couple of reports of voter registration discrepancies, overvoting, and bypassing BVAS in certain areas indicating systemic breaches. For instance, INEC stated before the election that the number of registered voters entering into the election is 2,053,061; however, the cumulative figure from the LGA returning officer and electoral officer shows 2,051,135 – In Akoko Southwest, a whooping 4,341 RV were added to the registered while in Ondo East a whooping of 4,901 was reduced from the initial figure released, and in Ilaje, 1,063 were reduced from the initial number of RV released by INEC. These can be traced to a lot of things but one of them is how the poll workers manage the process and records at the PUs which is at the heart of the quality of data released at all levels- Equally, this speaks to the credibility of the process.

  5. Conduct of Political Stakeholders (Parties Agent, Supporters and Candidates): There were several reports of political party polling agents interfering in the process and doing beyond what their legal roles are – Polling agents were widely seen as the merchants of vote buying in most polling units. 58% of the violent acts reported to the KDI EDR were perpetrated by the party agents – there were instances where blatant vote buying by party agents led to clashes notably in Ward 5 PU 3 in Idanre LGA – where it was alleged that it was one of the party agents that called the thugs that came to shoot sporadically in the air. In Odigbo Ward 1 PU 63, party agents were seen desecrating the secrecy of the ballot by trying to tell the voters how and where to vote which led to physical assault and the same happened in Ward 10 PU 11 of the same LGA. In ward 8 PU 6 in Akoko South-East LGA, observers saw party agents fighting over who would assist an elderly man to vote. These call for concern and must be nipped in the bud before they grow out of wings.

  6. Electoral Security Management: Despite 26 verified reports of election-related violence, the overall process was relatively peaceful compared to past elections. However, six of these incidents led to polling disruptions and ballot box snatching, notably in polling unit 3 Ward 5 in Idanre LGA where the party shot sporadically in the air and dispersed voters. Another incident happened in Ward 8 Unit 16, Ifedore LGA; Ward 7 Unit 4, Ose LGA; Ward 7 Unit 19, Ogbagi in Akoko North-West and Ward 8 Unit 8 in Idanre LGA which led to the disruption of polls and snatching of ballot boxes. Party agents were alleged to have called in thugs to invade these polling units. While no fatalities were recorded, these incidents highlighted residual vulnerabilities in election security.

  7. Election Day Operations – Logistics: Polling stations were well-prepared, and material deployment was timely, contributing to an orderly process. Observers noted no instances of ballot tampering, but incidents of ballot box snatching occurred in several polling units, such as those in Ifedore, Ose, and Akoko North-West LGAs.

  8. Access to Results: INEC achieved a 97% upload of polling unit results on IReV by 9:30 PM on election day, enabling timely and reliable public access to election outcomes. Preliminary assessments using the Ballot Integrity Project (BIP) methodology confirmed alignment between declared results and uploaded results.

  9. Inclusive and Accurate Counting: The BVAS and IReV systems ensured transparency in the vote-counting process. KDI completed the preliminary analysis of the data uploaded to the IReV, using the Ballot Integrity Project (BIP) methodology. With a margin of error of ±2%, The INEC declared results are consistent with the figures expected, benchmarking it with results on IReV and the ones gotten from the PUs and Wards. However, very important discrepancies were observed. Twenty-five (25) Form EC40Gs were uploaded to IReV, these highlighted issues such as disruptions, overvoting, and BVAS malfunctions in 9 LGAs—Akoko Northwest, Akure North, Akure South, Ese-Odo, Idanre, Ilaje, Ileoluji/Okeigbo, and Ondo West. Nevertheless, Okitipupa LGA's returning officer scored PU 1, Ward 10, zero due to overvoting. Other returning officers did not report cancellations in any polling unit in their LGAs at the State Collation Center. This is not in alignment with the number of EC40Gs uploaded on IReV. While the collection of PVCs by registered voters in this area does not impact the declared outcome or alter its trajectory, we express significant concern regarding this action. In cases where the margin of lead is narrow, it could potentially compromise the integrity of the election.

    Additionally, INEC declared that 510,862 voters were accredited, yielding 497,007 valid votes and 11,886 rejected ballots, resulting in a total of 508,963 total votes cast. This leads to a discrepancy of 1,899 accredited voters whose votes were omitted from both the valid and rejected vote classifications. If only one PU was reported to have experienced overvoting, by INEC returning officials from LGAs, this raises a pertinent question: Where are the 1,899 missing votes?

  10. Monitoring and Observation: INEC accredited 134 monitoring groups, including 124 domestic and 10 international organisations, ensuring robust independent oversight. Based on our observations, domestic observers were granted unrestricted access to collation centres at the Ward and LGA levels, contributing to a transparent observation process.

  11. Legal Enforcement: There were reported pockets of arrests due to vote buying, specifically, the DSS arrested a suspect with two bags of money alleged to be for voter inducement at Ward 4, Polling Unit 007, near St. Stephen’s Primary School in Akure. There has been little, or no evidence of prosecution documented. As of the preceding week of the election day, the Deputy Inspector General of Police in charge of the Ondo 2024 governorship election, said the suspects arrested by the DSS on Saturday over alleged vote buying had yet to be handed over to the police. The lack of enforcement and prosecution of electoral offenders reflects broader challenges in addressing electoral misconduct in Nigeria.


CONCLUSION

The Ondo 2024 elections were conducted with notable efforts toward transparency and monitoring. Transparency measures such as BVAS and IReV boosted confidence, the process largely allowed voter participation and ensured timely result dissemination, systemic issues—including weak enforcement of laws, procedural inconsistencies, party agent misconduct, and technical irregularities, posed a challenge to the election’s credibility, and these issues must be addressed to enhance future electoral processes. Thus, the elections can be categorised as partially free and fair, demonstrating progress in some areas but requiring substantial reforms to achieve higher integrity and broader acceptance in future elections.


RECOMMENDATIONS

Based on the analysis and observations of the Ondo 2024 elections, the following recommendations aim to address identified issues and reinforce democratic principles:

  1. Strengthen Enforcement Mechanisms against Election Misconduct
    • Establish mobile courts on election day to swiftly address cases of vote-buying, intimidation, and other violations.
    • Empower the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) and Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) to collaborate more actively with INEC in monitoring and prosecuting electoral offences, especially vote buying.
    • Increase penalties for violations to deter misconduct, such as vote-buying and ballot box snatching.
  2. Improve BVAS and Technological Efficiency
    • Conduct rigorous pre-election testing of BVAS devices and ensure the availability of technical support teams across all polling units.
    • Increase training for polling officials to minimize errors in BVAS operation and troubleshooting.
    • Expand investment in backup systems to address potential malfunctions on election day.

The full recommendations are contained in the comprehensive final statement that will be given to you after this briefing, and it can also be downloaded on www.kimpact.org.ng.

By implementing these recommendations, Nigeria can further entrench the principles of democracy, strengthen the credibility of its electoral processes, and foster public trust in democratic institutions. KDI remains committed to supporting efforts that promote electoral integrity and accountability in Nigeria.

We commend the people of Ondo State, INEC, security agencies, and civil society partners for their roles in this election and urge stakeholders to take these lessons forward in the collective quest for a stronger democracy.

Thank you for your attention.

Signed
Bukola Idowu
Team Lead
Kimpact Development Initiative

For further inquiries, please contact:
Email: info@kimpact.org.ng
Phone: +234 706 6992 376

KIMPACT

DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVE